Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

Fall 2018

Milking the Estate
David R. Hague
St. Mary's University School of Law, dhague@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
David R. Hague, Milking the Estate, 121 W. Va. L. Rev. 83 (2018).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

MILKING THE ESTATE

David R. Hague*

I.

INTRODUCTION.

II.

CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY

A.
B.

C.
III.

..................................

.....

84
88

...............................

Liquidationand Propertyof the Estate...
..............
The Trustee and His Duties
....................
1. The Trustee as a Fiduciary ............
..........
2. The Chapter 7 Trustee's Duties Under 11 U.S.C. § 704...
3. Common Law Duties of Loyalty and Care .
..........
The Payment Pecking Order........................

EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES

88
90
91
94
95
98

............... 99

A.

IV.

V.

VI.

In-House Employment.......................
99
1. Section 327(a) ...............................
100
2. Section 327(d)
................
.................. 101
B. The Compensation Schemes....
................... 103
1. The Compensation Scheme for Trustees ....
....... 103
2. The Compensation Scheme for The Trustee's Own
Law Firm.
............................
..... 105
MILKING THE ESTATE
.............................. 105
A. The Trustee-Attorney Blur ...............
..........
106
1. In re McCollom (2016)
................... 108
2. In re King (2016)..................
............. 109
3. In re Peterson (2017) ...............
................ 111
B. Lack of Checks and Balances ......................
113
....... 114
....................
C. FinancialSelf-Interest
MINIMIZING THE MILKING
......................
..... 120
A. The PreliminaryBudget andAsset-Recovery Plan............... 123
B. Interim Reports, Applications, andthe Duty to Abandon..... 127
C. A CallforRepeal of § 32 7(d)..............
........ 128
CONCLUSION

.............................................

132

Recent Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases are exposing a widespreadproblem.
Chapter7 trustees are retainingtheir own lawfirms to representthem and thenin clear breach of their fiduciary duties to creditors-requestingillegitimate
legal fees to be paid by the estate. This practice is immoral and particularly
harmful to creditors. Indeed, every dollarpaid to the trustee and his firm is a
Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary's Law School.
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dollar that will not be distributed to creditors. The Bankruptcy Code,
remarkably, allows a trustee to retain his own law firm to represent him in his
capacity as a trustee. But this inherently conflicted arrangementis not a license
for the trustee and hisfirm to milk the estatefor all it is worth. While courts have
recognized the dangers attendantto the trustee's retention of himselfto serve as
his own paid employee, they are routinely allowing it and only requiring the
trustee to make one opaque showing: that the selection of the trustee's own law
firm is in the "best interestof the estate."
This approachis significantlyflawed. In nearly all cases, the trustee is
able to satisfy the nebulous "best-interest" standardand secure employment of
his law firm. However, the impropriety of such arrangementdoes not manifest
itself until months or years later, when the trustee and his firm have already
milked the estate. Insteadofdealingwith this issue when the damage to the estate
.has already been done-or in some cases ignoring it-courts need to adopt
protective measures, and this Article outlines several. Abusive fee tactics in
bankruptcy will never disappear, but implementing the safeguards discussed
herein will curtailthe milking (andthe bilking).

"The [bankruptcy] estate is not a cash cow to be milked to death by
professionalsseeking compensationfor services renderedto the estate which
have not produceda benefit commensurate with the fees sought."

"While the Code expressly allows a trustee to retain his own lawfirm
to represent him in his capacity as a trustee, this is not a licensefor the trustee
and his firm to milk the estatefor all it is worth."2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you hire a lawyer and his firm to represent you in a breach of
contract case where approximately $50,000 is at stake. Things are moving along
rather smoothly, until you receive an invoice from your attorney for more than
$3,000 in travel expenses to attend oral argument approximately five hours away.
Surely, you think, this must be a mistake. Perhaps the lawyer mistakenly added
an extra "0" to the invoice. But as you dig deeper, you realize there is no mistake.
This is really an invoice that your lawyer wants you to pay. Through further
investigation, you find out that your attorney traveled with his wife, also a
member of his firm, and their two children, to this hearing. You also become
I
2

In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co., 105 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
In re King, 546 B.R. 682, 737 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).
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aware that their hotel was $359 a night, with additional hotel charges of $450.
And even though the hearing was scheduled for a short amount of time on a
single day, you learn that your lawyer remained at the hotel with his family for
five nights. In addition, you find out that a charge of $220 for meals has also
been added to your invoice as a cost. Would you pay? What would you say to
your lawyer when you receive this invoice? Would you accuse him of breaching
his fiduciary duties to you by attempting to charge you for the extended stay
when no legitimate purpose existed for the extended stay?
Or suppose that in the same breach of contract case, which had been
going on now for nearly four years, you receive your first invoice from your
lawyer for $55,000 in legal fees. Would you pay? Would you call up your lawyer
and ask him why he has not billed you in four years and why he is seeking
$55,000 in fees and costs for services rendered, which, at best, might result in a
$50,000 judgment-i.e., a $5,000 loss to you? If the legal fees exceed the
recovery, how can you possibly benefit? Did your lawyer breach his fiduciary
duty to you? At the very least, did your lawyer have a duty to consider the amount
in dispute and discount that by the likelihood of success in order to properly
evaluate the worth of the litigation? Did he have a duty to recommend that no
action be commenced if the cost of the battle would exceed the value of the
victory?
What if, in this same hypothetical, your lawyer was unsuccessful
because he failed to timely pursue your breach of contract case? Or, what if, you
actually had a solid case on the law and the facts, but, the defendant was insolvent
at the time litigation commenced? Did your lawyer have a duty to tell you that
your case-albeit strong-should not be pursued because the potential costs
exceeded any reasonably-expected recovery?
There is at least one clear answer to all of these questions posed: you,
the client, absolutely would not pay for the unnecessary fees and costs billed to
you by your lawyer. You would fight him tooth and nail over payment.
Unfortunately, each of these hypotheticals mentioned has happened in recent
bankruptcy cases. But the victims in these cases-i.e., the unsecured creditorsdid not have the same leverage that the ordinary client might have regarding the
legal fees. Indeed, their representatives-the Chapter 7 Trustee and his law
firm-were already in possession of the funds. In other words, in these cases, the
unsecured creditors could not withhold payment for the improper charges
because their money was being held in the trustee's piggybank, ready to be
applied to these unnecessary fees and costs.
Why is the behavior identified above becoming so prevalent in Chapter
7 cases? A few reasons exist, but surprisingly, it is the Bankruptcy Code and
some bankruptcy judges that are allowing trustees to put the interest of
themselves and their personal law firms ahead of the interest of the estate.
3
See, e.g., In re IFS Fin. Corp., 803 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 2015); In re McLean Wine Co., 463
B.R. 838 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); In re Minich, 386 B.R. 723 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).
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Section 327(d) of the Code actually allows a trustee to employ himself (and his
firm) as attorney for the estate.' There is inherent impropriety in such an
arrangement. First, the trustee has a duty to monitor all legal fees in the
bankruptcy case to ensure that they are reasonable, necessary, and likely to
provide a benefit to the estate.' This duty, alone, automatically puts the trustee
at odds with his law firm, to whom he also owes fiduciary duties as a shareholder.
Indeed, he now occupies a position of serving two masters when he is (a) required
to maximize distributions to creditors of the estate while (b) retaining a
substantial pecuniary interest in seeing that he and his law firm obtain recovery
of fees and costs expended on the case, regardless of whether such fees are
necessary and beneficial to the estate.
Moreover, by allowing this employment arrangement, § 327(d) is also
facilitating trustee and attorney wrongdoing. As one court observed, "[a]
disturbing trend has developed among Chapter 7 panel trustees. . . to disregard
the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules as they administer their assigned
cases."6 This occurs, for instance, when the trustee's firm is seeking to be
reimbursed for duties that are solely the responsibility of the trustee. The
Bankruptcy Code precludes reimbursing a law firm or an individual attorney for
work of the type that is generally performed by a trustee without the aid of legal
counsel.' But when the trustee is sharing the same bed as his law firm and trying
to fill dual roles as the trustee and the attorney for the trustee, the lines and legal
duties between trustee and attorney become significantly blurred and, thus, so do
the legal fees.
Surprisingly, there is only one hurdle in place when the trustee wants to
employ himself and his firm to act as attorney for the estate. Under § 327(d),
"[t]he court may authorize the trustee to act as attorney . . for the estate if such
authorization is in the best interest of the estate."I The term "best interest of the
estate," however, is not defined in the Code, and courts, practitioners, and
scholars have interpreted this phrase in various ways. Further, several judges
simply "rubber-stamp" these employment applications without ever conducting
a hearing or taking testimony from the trustee about why he has chosen to hire
his own firm and why such retention is in the best interest of the estate. But even
if the court-after a careful review of the application and perhaps a hearingmakes a finding that employment is in the "best interest of the estate," there still
exists a fundamental problem that bankruptcy judges are ignoring. Now that all
of the legal work is "in-house" and the representation has been approved by the
court, there are literally no checks and balances in place to keep the trustee and

4

6

7
8

11 U.S.C. § 327(d) (2018).
Id. § 704(a)(5) (effective Dec. 22, 2010).
In re McCollom Interests, LLC, 551 B.R. 292, 294-95 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).
11 U.S.C. § 328(b).
Id. § 327(d) (emphasis added).
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his firm honest and motivated to maximize the estate. The trustee's litigation
partners will be financially motivated to litigate rather than to find more costeffective means to resolve disputes. Will the trustee truly be comfortable
questioning the litigation strategies or the excessive billing of his partners when
the trustee himself stands to gain financially as higher and unnecessary fees are
billed to the estate? At the same time, the trustee may be encouraged to "double
dip" by billing certain tasks as an "attorney" when it is clear he might otherwise
perform the same task as an administrative function of his job as a trustee. This
billing strategy puts significantly more cash in the trustee's pocket, but it
obviously depletes the estate.
The Bankruptcy Code that allows this employment arrangement is
flawed. Likewise, bankruptcy judges are abdicating their solemn responsibility
to protect the estate by allowing trustees and their firms to get away with these
deceptive billing practices. The current approach for dealing with in-house
retention yields substantial problems and diminution to the bankruptcy estate.
This Article contends that more conditions and controls should be put in place
before courts approve the trustee's application to employ himself and his law
firm. But that is not all. This Article suggests that even after employment,
additional safeguards must exist in order to protect creditors and to minimize the
milking of the estate.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Chapter 7 bankruptcy and
a detailed discussion on the duties of a Chapter 7 trustee. Part III discusses how
the Bankruptcy Code and courts deal with in-house employment and
compensation schemes. Part IV identifies the built-in conflicts and the harm to
the bankruptcy estate as a result of these arrangements. Finally, Part V suggests
that courts order trustees and their firms to produce a preliminary budget and
asset-recovery plan at the inception of employment or as a condition to
employment. This will allow courts and creditors to observe and fully understand
contemplated litigation and contested matters that will hopefully bring value to
the estate. Part V also encourages courts to establish an interim-report
framework, whereby, the trustee submits periodic reports detailing the pending
litigation, the likelihood of settlement, the fees and costs incurred thus far, and
additional contemplated litigation. By reviewing these reports at various stages
of litigation, both the court and the creditors can decide whether the fees and
costs are outweighing any potential benefit to the estate. At this juncture, the
court and creditors can encourage or perhaps even force the trustee to abandon
these fruitless-producing claims. As part of the interim-reporting requirement,
trustees and their counsel should also be required to file quarterly fee
applications. Lastly, Part V discusses an alternative mechanism for dealing with
this inherent problem: a repeal of § 327(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY

Liquidationand Propertyof the Estate

To fully understand how the trustee and his firm are able to milk the
estate, one must grasp the overall concept of Chapter 7 bankruptcy and how
everyone gets paid. Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled "Liquidation"
or "Straight Bankruptcy" and is the most common chapter used by debtors.' Its
purpose is to provide debtors with a fresh start. In a Chapter 7 case, a trustee is
appointed and his duty is to collect the nonexempt property of the debtor, convert
that property to cash, and distribute that cash to creditors in accordance with the
distribution scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. 0 Essentially, the debtor gives up
all nonexempt property she owns at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition in exchange for a discharge of all her debts."
In a very simplified overview, the basic stages of a Chapter 7 case are: (1)
the Chapter 7 petition is filed, (2) the filing of the petition results in the stay of
creditor collection activity 2 and the appointment of a trustee to administer the
case," (3) the debtor exercises exemption rights with respect to her property,' 4
(4) the trustee collects and sells or liquidates any property available for
distribution to the creditors,'" (5) the proceeds from the sale of the property are
used to pay administrative expenses and the claims of the creditors according to
the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme, I and (6) the debtor may be discharged
from any remaining prepetition debts '7 that are not exempted from discharge.'"
Because one of the essential duties of the trustee is to collect and reduce
to money "property of the estate,"" which then (hopefully) gets distributed to
creditors, understanding the meaning of "property of the estate" and its

9
See In re Brooks, 784 F.3d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that Chapter 7 is the most
"common form of bankruptcy in the United States").
10
11 U.S.C. § 704(a).

I
The right to a discharge is not absolute, and some types of debt are not discharged. For
example, if the debtor has committed some bad act enumerated in § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the debtor may not be entitled to any discharge. Id. § 727(a). Moreover, certain enumerated debts
set forth in § 523(a) are not dischargeable. Id. § 523(a). Additionally, bankruptcy discharge does
not extinguish consensual liens on the debtor's property. Young v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re
Young), No. 04-32102, 2007 WL 1159952, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2007).
12
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
13
Id. § 701(a).
14
Id. § 522(b).
'5
16
17
18
19

Id. § 704(a).
Id. § 726.
Id. § 727.
Id. § 523(a).
Id § 704(a)(1).
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application in bankruptcy cases is crucial for trustees, judges, practitioners, and
creditors. When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a new legal person-the
estate-is automatically created. Bankruptcy Code § 541(a) provides that the
estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case." 2 0 Congress intended this section to be construed
as broadly as possible to encompass all types and kinds of property. 2' Property
of the estate, therefore, "describes the assets in any particular bankruptcy
proceeding that are used to satisfy pre-filing claims as well as the costs of the
bankruptcy proceeding. But for the bankruptcy filing, these assets would have
belonged to the debtor." 2 2
Because the definition of "property of the estate" is so broad, and
because it is the source from which creditors are paid, it also, innately, "includes
causes of action, which are considered property of the bankruptcy estate 'if the
claim existed at the commencement of the filing and the debtor could have
asserted the claim on his own behalf under state law."' 23 In fact, "'[e]very
conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent,
speculative, and derivative, is within the reach of the bankruptcy estate."24 Thus,
as representative of the estate, the Chapter 7 trustee succeeds to all causes of
action held by the debtor, including, among others, causes of action for
preferential and fraudulent transfers, breaches of contract, turnover and
accounting, etc. 25 Accordingly, "once a Chapter 7 petition is filed, the debtor no
longer has standing to pursue a cause of action which existed at the time the
Chapter 7 petition was filed, because the trustee has the sole authority to
prosecute such causes of action." 26

Id. § 541(a)(1).
See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868; H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6322-24.
22
AM. BANKR. INST., Bankruptcy Concepts, in BANKRUPTCY ISSUES FOR STATE TRIAL COURT
JUDGES, § A (Michaela M. White ed., 2012). Some of the debtor's assets, although initially
characterized as property of the estate, "later exit this category when they are exempted by the
debtor, abandoned by the trustee as burdensome or inconvenient, redeemed by the debtor, or sold
by the trustee." Id. at § B.
23
In re Emoral, 740 F.3d 875, 879 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund
v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 169 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002)).
24
Ritchie Capital Mgmt. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 121 F. Supp. 3d 321, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (quoting Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008)).
25
Detrick v. Panalpina, 108 F.3d 529, 535 (4th Cir. 1997); see also In re Haguen Const. Serv.,
104 B.R. 233, 234 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989) (stating that "[i]n furtherance of the power to collect
property of the estate, the trustee is empowered with extraordinary abilities to avoid and recover
various liens and transfers including those that are fraudulent and preferential").
26
Bluemark, Inc. v. Geeks on Call Holdings, Inc., No. 2:09CV322, 2010 WL 28720, at *3
(E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2010); see also Richman v. First Woman's Bank, 104 F.3d 654, 656 (4th Cir.
1997) (stating that after the conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, the trustee was the party who
was entitled to prosecute the lawsuit, and debtor lacked standing); Marshall v. Honeywell Tech.
20
21
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With these principles in mind, it is clear that "one of the [many] duties
of the bankruptcy trustee is to prosecute all causes of action accruing to the
bankrupt estate that may result in additional income for the satisfaction of the
bankrupt's debt." 27 Indeed, these causes of action are frequently the only
mechanism of generating funds to pay creditors.
B.

The Trustee andHis Duties

As a representative of the estate, 28 the trustee is commended with
multiple fiduciary obligations and duties.2 9 A trustee's fiduciary obligations are
those specifically owed to unsecured creditors as well as the bankruptcy court.30
These essential obligations encompass "the duties of loyalty, distribution
maximization, diligence, due care, accountability, competence, claims review,
information disclosure, candor, civility, proper litigation preparation and
conduct, impartiality and its appearance, enforcement, supervision, compliance,
and good faith and fair dealing."" An appreciation of these duties is central to
this Article. The notion of a "conflict," or "self-dealing," or lack of
"disinterestedness" when it comes to the trustee's retention of himself and his
law firm would be shallow if the trustee's duties were characterized as minimal
or insignificant.
Section II.B. 1 discusses the trustee's obligations as a fiduciary in
bankruptcy cases, outlining the trustee's role to each party. Section II.B.2 notes
the trustee's principal duties, as called for under 11 U.S.C. § 704. Finally, Section
II.B.III names the most fundamental duties a trustee has, the common law duties
of loyalty and care.

Sols., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that debtor no longer has standing to
pursue claims which are property of the estate because the trustee assumes the status of the real
party in interest for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17); Cain v. Hyatt, 101 B.R. 440,
442 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that "[o]nly the trustee, as representative of the estate, has the authority
to prosecute and/or settle such causes of action").
27
Bd. of Dirs. of the Chestnut Grove Condo. Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 161
B.R. 860, 862 (D.D.C. 1993).
28
See 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2018) ("The trustee in a case under this title is the representative of

the estate."); see also I BANKRUPTCY
analyzing 11 U.S.C. § 323(a)).

LAW MANUAL

§ 4:7, n.1 (5th ed. 2016)(providing case law

29
See generally Hon. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147 (2006) (suggesting Chapter 7 trustee's
fiduciary obligations and institutional obligations are often at odds).
30
Id. at 148-49 (pointing out that a trustee's professional obligations fall into two different
groups: "fiduciary" and institutional).
3'
Id at 154.
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The Trustee as a Fiduciary

Even though the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically utilize fiduciary
terminology in respect to a Chapter 7 Trustee,3 2 "the cases uniformly refer to a
Chapter 7 Trustee as a fiduciary and to the trustee's obligations in a bankruptcy
case as fiduciary obligations."" The Chapter 7 Trustee Canon of Ethics, adopted
by the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees (NABT)3 4 in 2005, refers to
a trustee as a fiduciary situated in a "significant position of trust and
responsibility."3 5 The preamble reads as follows:
A Chapter 7 Trustee is committed to excellence in the
administration of bankruptcy cases and to carry out all duties
with the utmost integrity, diligence, and professionalism. Parties
are entitled to service that adheres to the highest standards of
professional, moral, and ethical conduct. As a fiduciary, a
trustee occupies a significant position of trust and responsibility
and is accountable to all in the bankruptcy system and the public
at large. 6
Case law has repeatedly reiterated that a Chapter 7 Trustee is a fiduciary37
"and the obligations imposed upon them to administer the bankruptcy estate are
fiduciary obligations as well."" A Chapter 7 Trustee owes these fiduciary duties
not just to the estate, but also to all the parties in interest in the bankruptcy
proceedings.39 The trustee, therefore, serves a dual function of representing the
rights of debtors and interests of creditors. The Bankruptcy Law Manual

See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (defining Chapter 7 Trustees duties and obligations).
3
Rhodes, supra note 29, at 218 n.35.
34
The Association, NAT'L Ass'N OF BANKR. TRS., https://www.nabt.com/AboutUs.cfm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2018) (providing the historical background and mission of NABT's formation,
which goes back to 1982).
3s
NAT'L Ass'N OF BANKR. TR., CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE CANON OF ETHICS (2005) [hereinafter
NABT CANON OF ETHICS], reprintedin David P. Lebowitz, Presentation to the Bankruptcy Section
of the Minnesota State Bar Association, http://documentsjdsupra.com/b72c9162-9ceO-4308-98f7fdf5167aabid.pdf.
36
Id. (emphasis added).
n
See In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a violation
of the trustee's "fiduciary" responsibilities constitutes "cause" and could lead to a panel trustee's
removal from a bankruptcy case); see also In re Robert Plan Corp., 439 BR. 29, 38 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev'd sub nom. U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Kirschenbaum, 508 BR. 257 (E.D.N.Y.
2014).
38
In re Robert Plan Corp., 439 B.R. at 38 (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union
Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. I (U.S. 2000).
3
See In re Mehr, 153 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993), superseded by statute, 26 U.S.C.
§ 121 (2018), as recognized in In re DiDario, 232 B.R. 311 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) ("The assets are
in the hands of the Trustee/estate for the benefit of creditors and parties in interest.").
32
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provides, "as a representative of the estate ... a fiduciary ... owes fiduciary
duties to the estate and its constituencies."4 0 These "constituencies" include both
secured and unsecured creditors,4 1 shareholders,42 and a solvent debtor,4 3
although the Bankruptcy Manual clarifies that the duty to creditors supersedes
the ones owed to shareholders." Case law has reiterated the trustee's fiduciary
duty is to "each creditor of the estate." 45 Although the courts have recognized the
trustee's obligation to ensure unsecured creditors are satisfied first,46 the trustee
"may not be the representative of any particular creditor, but must represent all
creditorswithout partiality." 47
Moreover, the trustee is meant to function independently, 48 not
necessarily as a specific representative for a specific party in interest. Indeed,
[w]hile the trustee's obligation is to marshal assets for the
benefits of creditors, that task is assumed as a fiduciary
relationship to the estate itself and not as some sort of "hired
gun." The trustee is not the employee or agent of the creditors;
they do not have the right to direct how the trustee chooses to
perform the statutory duties of the position. The trustee is in
essence an independent third party charged with the
responsibility of maximizing assets for the estate. A bankruptcy
trustee is an officer of the court that appoints him or her.4 9
As an independent third party, the trustee is, therefore, not mandated to hire
attorneys to assist with any of the trustee's obligations. In In re WHET, Inc.,`

40

1 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28,

§ 4:7.

41
Id.; see In re Troy Dodson Constr. Co., 993 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The trustee
owes a fiduciary duty to all the creditors, not just to the unsecured creditors.").
42
In re Troy Dodson Constr. Co., 993 F.2d at 1216.
43
See In re George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 145 B.R. 104, 107 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)
("There is hardly any doubt that upon the showing of surplus funds in the estate after distribution
to creditors, a Chapter 7 debtor is considered a party in interest."); see also In re Woods, 139 B.R.
876, 877 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (emphasizing "unless the estate is solvent, the debtor has no
pecuniary interest").
4
1 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28, § 4:7 n.21
45
Pereira v. Foong (In re Ngan Gung Restaurant), 254 B.R. 566, 570 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(analyzing the fiduciary duties of a Chapter 11 Trustee and stating they also apply in this Chapter
7 case).
46
See In re Balco Equities, Ltd., 323 B.R. 85, 97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
47
In re Russo, 18 B.R. 257, 270-71 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasis added).
48
In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 189 B.R. 906, 910 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Section 323 provides
that the trustee is the representative of the estate. In that capacity, the trustee is a fiduciary and
intended to be independent.").
49
In re Vazquez, 325 B.R. 30, 37-38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
50
750 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1984).
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for example, the sole stockholder and CEO of the debtor corporation appealed
the bankruptcy court's decision rejecting his petition to act as counsel, or to
appoint another attorney for the debtor.51 In upholding the bankruptcy court's
ruling, the First Circuit focused on 11 U.S.C. § 323 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which states "[a] trustee . .. is a 'representative of the estate,' . . . and as such he

owes a fiduciary duty to debtor and creditors alike to act fairly and protect their
interests." 5 2 Although the trustee may hire attorneys to assist him with furthering
his duties in representing the estate, there is no such mandate when the trustee is
"fairly protect[ing] the debtor's interests.""
Further, a trustee owes no duty to third parties or insolvent debtors. The
Bankruptcy Manual states "[t]he trustee owes no fiduciary duty to strangers to
the estate or the case; that is, third parties who may be involved in case matters
but who are not the debtor, creditors, or other parties in interest." 4 Courts have
often blurred the lines "between two types of actions against trustees: breach of
fiduciary duty claims brought by parties interested in the administration of the
estate, and claims in tort or contract brought by third parties."s It is well settled,
however, that third parties alleging claims sounding in tort against the trustee
simply lack standing to assert such claims.5 6 In regard to the debtor, the
Bankruptcy Manual claims a fiduciary duty may be owed when the estate is
solvent." An insolvent debtor has been found to have "no standing to object to
the trustee's sale of property unless a successful appeal would create an estate
with assets in excess of liabilities." 58 For example, in In re Ebel, " the court found
the estate to be "hopelessly insolvent" and as such, the trustee owed no fiduciary
duties to the Chapter 7 debtor.60

51
52

Id
Id. (citing Citibank N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir. 1981)).

5
Id; cf In re Holliday's Tax Servs., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd sub nom.
Holliday's Tax Servs., Inc. v. Hauptman, 614 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1979).
54
1 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28; see also 2 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL §
10:13 n.41 (5th ed. 2016) (citing In re C.R. Stone Concrete Contrs., 346 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2006).
5
Lassman v. Reilly (In re Feeley), 393 B.R. 43, 49 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (citing In re
Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999)).
56
Id. at 50.
5"
I BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supranote 28 ("[A trustee] may owe such duties to the debtor
where the estate is solvent. . . .").
58
Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4th Cir. 1985).
59
338 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005).
60
Id. at 873.
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2. The Chapter 7 Trustee's Duties Under 11 U.S.C. § 704
Section 704 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the majority of a
trustee's statutory obligations to the estate and its creditors. 6 1 "The trustee . . . at
a minimum is under a duty to perform the statutory duties given to the trustee in
the Code in an ordinarily prudent manner."6 2 In examining the Bankruptcy
Code's statutory framework regarding trustee duties, § 4:7 of the Bankruptcy
Law Manual outlines the "[r]ole and capacity of the trustee"" to include
"expeditiously gather[ing] assets of the estate and administer[ing] them;
preserv[ing] the assets of the estate[,] ... invest[ing] the assets of the estate
prudently and mak[ing] distributions, if any, in timely fashion."6 4 This fiduciary
obligation, provided by § 704(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, to "collect and
reduce to money the property of the estate . .. ,""5 is seen as the trustee's

.

principalresponsibility. This duty equates to realizing the maximum benefit"
for the estate's unsecured creditors." Case law also has specifically highlighted
§ 704(a)(1) as the Trustee's main duty." As one court noted, "[tihe duty to close
the estate as quickly and expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of
the parties in interest has been called the trustee's 'main duty."'6 9 This same court
also claimed that the other provisions were "merely directory as to what the
trustee shall do in accomplishing the main objective and purpose of the
appointment. .
These "directory" provisions under § 704 of the Bankruptcy Code are
summarized in detail in Section 10:13 of the Bankruptcy Law Manual. " Aside

61

1 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28, at nn.18-19 ("The trustee owes fiduciary

duties to all creditors, whether unsecured or secured.").
62
See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (charging a Chapter 7 Trustee with specific duties ); see also 1
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28, at § 4:7 ("[Tlrustee at a minimum is under a duty to
perform the statutory duties given to the trustee in the Code.").
63

1 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28.

6

Id.

11 U.S.C. § 704 (a)(1) (2018); see also In re Robert Plan Corp., 439 B.R. 29, 38 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2010) (deeming 11 U.S.C. § 704 (a)(1) as a Chapter 7 trustee's primary obligation).
66
See In re Balco Equities, Ltd., 323 B.R. 85, 98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing In re Mondie
Forge, Inc., 148 B.R. 499, 502 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)) (emphasizing a trustee's duty to "realize
the maximum return for the estate for further distribution to the Debtor's creditors").
67
In re Poage, 92 B.R. 659, 662 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (citing Fox v. Anderson (In re Thu
Viet Dinh), 80 B.R. 819, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987)) (highlighting a trustee's primary obligation
of ensuring unsecured creditors are satisfied first).
68
See 2 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 54, § 10:13 n.19 (providing case law
exploring § 704(a)(1)).
69
In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 85 B.R. 107, 111 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988).
70
Id.
65

7
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from collecting and reducing the property of the estate to cash, the provisions
also include filing a complete inventory; "keeping records of receipts and the
disposition of money and property, and filing reports with the court and the U.S.
Trustee with respect to the financial condition and progress of the administration
of the estate[;]" ensuring a debtor accomplishes the statement of intention;
conducting investigations concerning the debtor's financial affairs; examining
proofs of claim and objecting to the allowance of any claims when necessary; 7 2
challenging a debtor's discharge if necessary; providing any needed information
in regards to the bankruptcy proceedings; filing "periodic reports and summaries
of the operation of the business" if the business is still operational; filing "a final
report and fil[ing] a final account of the administration of the estate[;]" and
advising "a domestic support creditor in writing of the existence of and right to
use support enforcement and collection agencies during the case and also
provid[ing] notice of such a claim to the enforcement agencies." 73
The Supreme Court has also reiterated the extensive powers
encompassed by a Chapter 7 trustee in bankruptcy proceedings. 7 4 in Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub," the Supreme Court listed a trustee's
broad powers to include the "[responsibility] for all property received"; "duty to
maximize the value of the estate"; duty to "investigate the debtor's financial
affairs"; ability to "sue officers, directors, and other insiders to recover on behalf
of the estate, fraudulent or preferential transfers of the debtor's property," ability
to "use, sell or lease property of the estate" as long as the Court authorizes it; and
even "operate the debtor's business" in reorganization.76
3.

Common Law Duties of Loyalty and Care

Finally, "[tihe trustee owes the general common law duties that a trustee
owes as a fiduciary," which are known as the duty of loyalty and duty of care. 7
The duty of loyalty, "the duty not to act in the fiduciary's own interest,"" is "the
most fundamental duty owed." " In Wooten v. Wooten,"o the Tenth Circuit Court

72
See In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09-10138, 2017 WL 932947, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del.
2017) (stating a trustee acted prudently because he filed and amended proofs of claim).
7

2 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 54,

74
7

See Rhodes, supra note 29, at 152.
471 U.S. 343 (1985).

76

Id, at 352.

77

1 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28.

78

Id

§

10:13.

79
Rhodes, supra note 29, at 156 (stating the duty of loyalty "prohibits retaining professionals
that have that first hand knowledge," and those with claims against the estate).
8o
151 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1945).
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of Appeals underscored the importance of the fiduciary duty of loyalty imposed
on trustees:
The standards of conduct for a trustee rise far above the ordinary
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but a punctilio of
honor the most sensitive is the standard of behavior required of
a trustee. He must completely efface self-interest. His loyalty
and devotion to his trust must be unstinted. Its well-being must
always be his first consideration. These principles are inveterate
and unbending.8 1

Although discussing these duties in the context of an executor of an estate, the
Wooten case has been cited several times by bankruptcy courts when discussing
the fiduciary duties of a bankruptcy trustee. 8 2
Further, § 704 of the Bankruptcy Code discusses the duty of loyalty by
requiring an appointed trustee to be a disinterested party" and therefore avoiding
potential self-dealing. A trustee's independent and disinterested judgment would
obviously be compromised if there were self-dealing.8 4 More importantly, this
duty of loyalty and obligation to remain impartial, "extends to the trustee's
professionals."" In general, any professional who has a "financial stake in
maximizing the estate" cannot assist the trustee.86 There is a peculiar exception
to this general rule in regard to a trustee (and his law firm) functioning as an
attorney during the bankruptcy proceedings. Section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code
explicitly authorizes such action if "such authorization is in the best interest of
the estate."" As discussed infra, this provision of the code authorizing this
inherently-conflicted arrangement causes serious problems when compensation
is sought by the trustee and his firm.
Courts tend to assess the law of trusts when determining if the duty of
loyalty has been violated." The Law of Trusts and Trustees states
[a] trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary of the trust to
administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary. The
trustee must exclude all self-interest, as well as the interest of a

Id. at 149-50.
See, e.g., In re Republic Fin. Corp., 128 B.R. 793, 802 (Bankr. N.D. Ok. 1991) (discussing
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Wooten and applying trust principles to the bankruptcy trustee).
83
11 U.S.C. § 704 (a)(1) (2018); see also I THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing the "obvious conflict between the individual interest of the trustee and the
interest of the trust and its beneficiary in the transaction involving trust property").
84
Id.
81

82

87

Rhodes, supra note 29, at 159.
Id. at 160.
11 U.S.C. § 327(d).

88

BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL,

85
86

supra note 28.
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third party, in his administration of the trust solely for the benefit
of the beneficiary. The trustee must not place himself in a
position where his own interests or that of another enters into
conflict, or may possibly conflict, with the interest of the trust
or its beneficiary. Put another way, the trustee may not enter into
a transaction or take or continue in a position in which his
personal interest or the interest of a third party is or becomes
adverse to the interest of the beneficiary."
In dissecting the duty of loyalty under the Uniform Trust Code, one
author focused on human nature and how that may inevitably cause a trustee to
favor himself over those to whom he owes fiduciary duties.o "The trust law
concept . . acknowledges that human nature will cause any person to favor his
or her personal interests .

.

. and it is this assumption of disloyalty that gives rise

to the strict prohibitions of trustee conflicts of interest required under the label
of 'duty of loyalty.'" This favoritism of one's personal interests is particularly
widespread in cases where a fiduciary has retained himself to serve as his own
paid employee.
While the duty of care has not been codified in the Bankruptcy Code, it
has been addressed by case law, including the Supreme Court of the United
States. The duty of care emphasizes the requirement to act reasonable in carrying
out all other duties and obligations, and not to act negligently.9 2 In FordMotor
Credit Co. v. Weaver,9 3 the Sixth Circuit explained "[t]he measure of care,
diligence and skill required of a trustee is that of 'an ordinarily prudent man in
the conduct of his private affairs under similar circumstances and with a similar
object in view.'"" The Supreme Court echoed the sentiment more than forty
years prior, "[b]y the common law every trustee or receiver of an estate has the
duty of exercising reasonable care in the custody of the fiduciary estate unless
relieved of such duty by agreement, statute, or order of court.""s
In short, as a clear fiduciary, the trustee is charged with several duties
and obligations-"perhaps [even] at a heightened level""-when carrying out
his responsibilities to the estate. The most critical concem, however, is the
question of whether the trustee is meeting the fiduciary duty incumbent upon him

89

I THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 83.

90
Karen E. Boxx, OfPunctiliosand Paybacks: The Duty ofLoyalty Under the Uniform Trust
Code, 67 Mo. L. REv. 279, 279 (2002).
91
92

Id.; see also 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 83.
1 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 28.

9

680 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 461 (quoting In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1975)).
United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 450 (1938).
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to maximize the value of the estate and conserve the estate's assets. There are
obvious issues with this obligation when the payment pecking order in Chapter
7 liquidation is fully comprehended.
C.

The Payment Pecking Order

Section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code controls the distribution of property
in a liquidation case." This section sets forth the order in which assets (which,
at this point, likely have been reduced to cash) are to be distributed to different
classes of claimants, beginning with what the Code refers to as "priority
claimants" and ending with the debtor. It states in relevant part: "(a) [P]roperty
of the estate shall be distributed-( 1) first, in payment of claims of the kind
specified in, and in the order specified in section 507 of this title . . . ."" Section
507 of the Bankruptcy Code is the priority scheme that is followed in a
liquidation case under Chapter 7.99 Priorities of claims are significant in
bankruptcy because they determine the order in which claims are paid from
property of the bankruptcy case.'" Payment of claims, of course, assumes there
is actually property available in the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.
But the reality is that most Chapter 7 cases have no assets available for
distribution.
First in line for distribution in a Chapter 7 case are the secured creditors.
The holder of a secured claim will either get its collateral or get the proceeds of
its collateral to the extent of its claim in a Chapter 7 case.' Oftentimes, the
trustee will simply abandon the collateral and let the debtor and secured creditor
work out payment arrangements outside of the bankruptcy case. Thus, as a
general rule, all unsecured claims, including priority claims, come behind all
secured claims.1 0 2
Assuming there are funds and other unencumbered assets available, next
in line for distribution are "administrative expenses" allowed under § 503(b). An
administrative expense allowed under this section is the highest priority claim to
be paid in a bankruptcy case.' In Chapter 7 liquidation, administrative claims
are paid in full before any other distribution may be made.' Of relevance to this
Article is § 503(b)(2), which provides in relevant part as follows: "(b) After
notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative expenses ...

9
98
9

1oo
101

11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2018).
Id. (emphasis added).

See id § 507.
Id § 507.
Id. §§ 506(a), 725.
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See id. § 507.
Id. § 507(a)(1)(C).
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including--(2) compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 330(a)
of this title . . . ."'As flushed out in further detail in Part Ill of this Article, §
327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee may employ attorneys (and
other professionals) to represent or assist him in carrying out his duties.1 0 6
Section 330(a)(1), in turn, provides that the court may award to a trustee and his
lawyers reasonable compensation for fees and costs. 07 By making express
provisions for employment under § 327, payment under § 330, and priority under
§ 503(b)(2), the Code makes one thing very clear: the Chapter 7 trustee and his
lawyers must be paid all of their fees and costs in full before unsecured creditors
receive a dime.'0 8
Because of this exacting pecking order, requests for administrative
expenses should be subject to strict scrutiny by the court.' 09 As one court stated,
"[ijt is well settled that 'administrative expense priorities are to be narrowly
construed to foster the paramount principle in bankruptcy of equitable
distribution among creditors.1"0 This is because administrative expenses
deplete the funds available to general unsecured creditors. Indeed, "every dollar
that [a bankruptcy court] authorizes the Trustee to pay to the Firm is a dollar that
will not be distributed to unsecured creditors. . . ."" But while the award of fees
to the trustee and his lawyers are supposedly given strict scrutiny by the court,
the requirements for in-house retention are rather loose and ill-defined.
III.

EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES

A. In-House Employment
The law is clear that if a debtor has filed a lawsuit, or has the right to file
suit, after the debtor files for Chapter 7 relief, that lawsuit, or whatever rights the
debtor had in that lawsuit, belongs to the debtor's estate. Consequently, the
debtor's Chapter 7 trustee is the one who has the authority and the duty to go
forward with that suit. And as explained, the reason why the trustee must be the
one to prosecute actions is because the trustee has serious fiduciary
responsibilities. A "Chapter 7 trustee's duty is to reduce to money the legal or
equitable interests owned by the debtor in these various assets so that the

105

See id § 503(b)(2).
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Id. § 327(a).

Id. § 330(a)(1)(A), (B).
See id. §§ 327, 330, 503(b)(2).
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In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 151 B.R. 833, 837 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (citation omitted).
110
In re New England Software, Inc., 204 B.R. 334, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) (quoting In
re New York Trap Rock Corp., 137 B.R. 568, 572 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
Il
In re McCollom Ints., LLC, 551 B.R. 292, 298 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).
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proceeds may be distributed to unsecured creditors in accordance with Section
726."l 12
In order to comply with this duty to gather assets, prosecute the debtor's
choses in action, and liquidate assets in an efficient manner for the benefit of
creditors, the Bankruptcy Code specifically authorizes a trustee to employ
attorneys and other professionals. Two sections of the Bankruptcy Code address
the employment of an attorney to represent the trustee and the estate in
bankruptcy, namely § 327(a), which is discussed in Section III.A. 1, and § 327(d),
which is discussed in Section III.A.2." 3
1.

Section 327(a)

Bankruptcy Code § 327(a) authorizes the trustee to employ legal counsel:
"Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the court's
approval, may employ one or more attorneys . . that do not hold or represent an
interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent . .
the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under this title."" 4
The threshold question for the employment of any professional is the
necessity of employment. "'Additionally, "the trustee needs to determine at the
outset the level of professional work required and the estimated costs and
benefits associated with the work."" 6 The trustee's application for the profession
should include,
the name of the person to be employed, the reasons for the
selection, the professional services to be rendered, any proposed
arrangement for compensation, and, to the best of the applicant's
knowledge, all of the person's connections with the debtor,
creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys
and accountants, the United States Trustee, or any person
employed in the office of the United States trustee."'
The Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits the trustee from retaining
professionals who are not disinterested or who hold or represent any interest
adverse to the bankruptcy estate."

113

In re Talbert, 268 B.R. 811, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001).
11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a), (d).

114

Id. § 327(a).
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While the trustee generally has wide latitude in choosing his own
attorney-subject to bankruptcy court approval-the trustee must meet a higher
standard when he seeks to appoint himself or his own law firm as attorney.
2.

Section 327(d)

The appointment of a trustee as legal counsel for the estate is governed by §
327(d), which provides: "The court may authorize the trustee to act as
attorney ... for the estate if such authorization is in the best interest of the
estate."' 1
Bankruptcy Rule 2014(b) specifies the consequence to a trustee's law firm
of the appointment of the trustee as counsel: "If, under the Code and this rule ...
a named attorney ... is employed, any partner ... or regular associate of the ...
individual may act as attorney ... so employed, without further order of the
court." 2 0
Under this rule, it is clear that the employment of a trustee as counsel for
the estate is the functional equivalent of the employment of the trustee's law firm.
It is also clear that the only hurdle in the trustee's way is to show that this
arrangement is in the "best interest of the estate."
The term "best interest of the estate" is not defined by the Code, and courts
have interpreted this phrase in several different ways. Some courts have
interpreted the meaning of "best interest of the estate" to include avoiding the
conflict of interest that a law firm representing an estate may have when a
member of the firm is the trustee of that estate.121 Other courts focus on different
multi-factor tests. In In re Butler Indus., 122 for example, the court weighed the
following factors when construing the "best interest" requirement:
(1) "where the estate's assets consist principally in causes of
action, such as for preferences and fraudulent conveyances, and
legal counsel would have to look to the recovery for payment of
fees"; (2) "where there is relatively little legal work to perform,
which does not merit the effort and expense of hiring an outside
law firm"; (3) "where substantial legal action must be taken
immediately, and the trustee cannot wait for the completion of
the appointment process for outside counsel"; and (4) "where

"9
120

Id. § 327(d) (emphasis added).
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In re Butler Indus., 114 B.R. 695, 698-99 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
114 B.R. 695 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
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the trustee can demonstrate that such appointment will result in
a substantial reduction of costs to the estate."12 3
In another case, In re Interamericas,Ltd.,
nine-factor test:

124

the court employed the following

(1) The qualifications of the members of the firm compared to
the complexity of the case; (2) Whether the firm is regularly
hired by others to handle similar litigation; (3) Whether the
anticipated litigation predominantly involves issues of
bankruptcy law with which the law firm has particularized
expertise; (4) Whether the time commitment required to handle
the case is consistent with the size of the firm and the balance of
the firm's time commitments; (5) Whether only a nominal
amount of work must be performed; (6) The availability of other
qualified firms to handle the case; (7) The rates charged by the
firm compared to the rates charged by other qualified firms; (8)
Whether there will be material cost savings to the estate; and (9)
Other case-specific factors.' 2 1

Both of these "best-interest" tests have been criticized by courts. The
Interamericastest, for example, has been found to be too heavily focused "on
the qualifications and expertise of the trustee's firm and whether the size and
composition of the firm is a good fit for the case." 126 While these are important
factors to consider in hiring any firm, courts have found that these factors do not
necessarily help answer the question of when a trustee should be allowed to hire
his own firm. 127 The Butler test, although narrower in scope, and perhaps more
useful considering that it attempts to identify the benefits that an estate may
realize through such hiring, has also been criticized.1 28 For example, the first
factor mentioned in the Butler test-whether counsel will have to work on a
contingency basis-is not entirely useful because many firms will accept such
employment regardless of their expertise in the manner.1 2 9

123
See Spencer D. Solomon, Keeping Things In-House: IncreasingScrutiny of the Chapter 7
Trustee's Selection of Counsel, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 665, 679 (2014) (summarizing In re Butler
Indus., Inc., 101 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989)).
124
321 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
125
In re Interamericas, Ltd., 321 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
126
In re Wolfson, 575 B.R. 522, 526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2017).
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Simply put, there are fundamental problems with any multi-factor test
because those factors are not exclusive and, in fact, they rarely compel a given
result.13 0 As one court noted in discussing these factors:
They do not indicate whether all or even most of the factors must
be present. They say nothing about how much weight a judge
may or must give to any one factor. In short, they give the
appearance of an analytical framework and rigorous analysis,
but in reality, judges use them to justify the exercise of their
discretion. Whenever any decision is discretionary and tied to
the particular facts of a case, counsel struggle to predict how a
court will rule.'"'
In short, the Bankruptcy Code has not erected a blanket ban against a
trustee hiring in-house since § 327(d) expressly authorizes it with a nebulous
"best-interest-of-estate" test. Nonetheless, the practice of appointing a trustee
and his law firm as counsel for the estate must "be severely limited so as to
prevent abuse and the appearance of impropriety."' 32 This abuse is particularly
rampant when it comes to compensation of the trustee and his attorneys.
B.

The Compensation Schemes

"One of the most unpleasant judicial duties bankruptcy judges are called
upon to perform involves reviewing fee applications submitted by
professionals."' 3 3 This task of reviewing fee applications "is especially
unpleasant when the Trustee is permitted to serve not only as trustee but also as
the attorney for the trustee, because in such instances, [courts are] . . . generally

presented with two fee requests." '4 This first request is by the trustee and the
second by the trustee as attorney.
1.

The Compensation Scheme for Trustees

In exchange for managing and liquidating property of the estate, § 3 30(a)
of the Code allows a court to award reasonable compensation to trustees for

130

Id.

131

Id.

In re Mich. Interstate Ry. Co., 32 B.R. 325, 326 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
In re Perkins, 244 B.R. 835, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Mont. 2000); see also In re First Colonial
Corp., 544 F.2d 1291, 1301 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that "the determination of what constitutes
reasonable compensation for services furnished by an attorney in a bankruptcy proceeding can be
a distasteful task").
132
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actual, necessary services and reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses."
This compensation award, however, is limited by § 326(a). Section 326(a)
imposes a ceiling on the amount that can be awarded to the trustee, with the
award amount limited to an amount:
Not to exceed 25 percent on the first $5,000 or less, 10 percent
on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess of $50,000,
5 percent on any amount in excess of $50,000 but not in excess
of $1,000,000, and reasonable compensation not to exceed 3
percent of such moneys in excess of $1,000,000, upon all
moneys disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to
parties in interest, excluding the debtor, but including holders of
secured claims.137

Accordingly, one source of income for the trustee is payment for performing his
duties under § 704(a).
There is another available avenue for the trustee to earn money. As
discussed, the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to retain counsel to provide legal
assistance to the trustee.' 3 8 If the trustee is a licensed attorney, which he usually
is, the Bankruptcy Code also authorizes the trustee to serve in a dual capacity as
the attorney for the estate.' And when the trustee is associated with a firmeither as a partner or associate-the trustee is allowed to retain his own law firm
as counsel for the estate. 14 0 Consequently, a trustee can earn an additional source
of income simply by representing the estate himself or by being a partner or
associate at a law firm that represents the estate, the latter being particularly
beneficial to a trustee. Indeed, a trustee will act as the lawyer for the estate and
earn his own legal fees, but then in most cases, he will likely get an "origination"
cut from other lawyers in his firm who are providing legal work for the trustee's
"client." As an example, assume the trustee's law firm and the trustee, together,
bill $200,000 to the estate. Of that $200,000, assume $50,000 of it is for time the
trustee has billed wearing his lawyer hat. The other $150,000 is work performed
by his various partners and associates. A very conservative origination credit
would be 10%. Thus, the other lawyers would take $150,000 from the estate, but
be required to pay the trustee $15,000 from that amount because he originated
the work. This is the ideal situation for a trustee. Of course, any compensation
awarded in this situation must be done pursuant to a fee application with the
bankruptcy court, but the origination credit and bonuses provided by the firm to

136
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1

139
140
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the trustee for bringing in the work are done entirely in-house and behind closed
doors.
2. The Compensation Scheme for The Trustee's Own Law Firm
The Bankruptcy Code provisions governing fee requests made by the
trustee's own law firm are § 328(b) and § 330(a). "The purpose of § 328(b) is to
ensure that the trustee's firm is not compensated for rendering services that the
trustee himself has a duty to undertake pursuant to § 704(a)." 14 ' The purpose of
§ 330(a), on the other hand, is to "ensure that the fees awarded to the trustee's
firm are reasonable and only for services that were actually necessarily
rendered."

42

Accordingly, when a trustee and his law firm have been hired to
represent the estate and thereafter seek fees to be paid from the estate, the court
must undertake an analysis under both § 328(b) and § 330(a). First, under §
328(b), the court "must ensure that the services provided by the attorneys
representing the estate are not services that fall within the statutory duties of the
trustee." 4 3 This part of the analysis is critical. As stated succinctly by one
bankruptcy judge:
If the court were to approve fees for services rendered by the
attorneys representing the estate that fall within the trustee's
duties under § 704(a), then the court would be awarding a
windfall to the trustee; and, by doing so, the creditors of the
estate would suffer, as the trustee would be pocketing more
funds from the estate that would otherwise be distributed to the
"

creditors.

Once the court has performed its analysis under § 328(b), then it must analyze
the actual legal services pursuant to § 330(a) to determine whether those services
were reasonable and necessary.1 45
IV.

MILKING THE ESTATE

When a trustee wants to keep legal work in-house, there are two
mechanisms in place under the Bankruptcy Code that are intended to prevent and
curtail abusive fee tactics. The first is § 327(d).1 46 This section provides that a

43

In re King, 546 B.R. 682, 692 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).
Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 693 (emphasis in original).
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Id
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trustee is allowed to retain his law firm upon a showing that such employment is
in the best interests of the estate.1 4 7 But the term "best interest of the estate" is
not defined by the Code, and courts have struggled to define it and come up with
meaningful and effective tests. Furthermore, it is rare for creditors to even object
to any application to employ because they lack a fundamental understanding of
its significance to the bankruptcy estate. In fact, a substantial amount of creditors
would probably be surprised to learn that trustees and their lawyers are paid (1)
directly from the estate and (2) before all unsecured creditors. As a result, it is
my opinion that a fair amount of bankruptcy judges merely rubber stamp
employment applications without giving any thought as to whether the
employment arrangement is truly in the "best interest" of the estate or whether it
presents a conflict of interest.
The second mechanism to combat abuse is the analysis conducted,
sanguinely, under § 328(b) and § 330(a) once the fee applications are filed. These
provisions exist to ensure (1) that the services provided by the attorneys
representing the estate are not services that fall within the statutory duties of the
trustee and (2) that such services are reasonable and necessary.
These two mechanisms-although necessary to protect the estate and
creditors-expose a critical gap. Section 327(d) functions as nothing more than
an opaque gatekeeper with minor entry requirements. At the backend, §§ 328(b)
and 330(a) clearly serve a purpose, but the problems inherent with in-house
employment do not become an issue for the court until compensation is sought,
which could be years after the § 327(d) analysis is performed. In other words,
there are statutory devices in place to deal with abusive fee issues at the frontend
and backend of the case, but nothing in place to remediate or constrain trustee
and attorney activity during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.
And it is during this substantial gap period when most problems arise for
which the forward-looking approach of § 327(d) and the backward-looking
analysis of § 328(b) and § 330(a) cannot cure. Indeed, after a trustee is authorized
to employ himself and his own law firm to represent the estate, and before the
fee applications are filed, three clear areas of conflict arise which have an
enormous economic impact on the estate. The first touches on the classification
of services. The second deals with the trustee's responsibility to monitor legal
fees. The third is the inherent financial self-interest of the trustee.
A.

The Trustee-Attorney Blur

When a trustee has employed himself and his law firm as attorneys for the estate,
both to be paid from the receipts of the estate, a clear problem arises.
Unquestionably, this arrangement presents a situation that is "rife with conflict"

147

Id
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because the lines between trustee and attorney inevitably become blurred and
breached.'14

It may be impossible to articulate a definitive line between the
legally compensable duties of a trustee and those of a
professional appointed to assist the trustee. Nevertheless, it is
imperative that the court attempt to identify this line in each case
in order to prevent depletion of estates and derogation of the
principles underlying the Code. Such an attempt is especially
important in a case like this where the only distributions are to
the trustee and her hired professionals.' 4 9
The Bankruptcy Code precludes reimbursing a law firm for work of the
type that is supposed to be performed by the trustee. The duality of the attorneytrustee's role as trustee and as a member of the law firm is problematic. Because
of their close relationship, it is difficult to ascertain whether the law firm is
rendering services that, by express statute, are to be discharged by the trustee.
Courts should not be put to the tedious and arduous task of second-guessing
attorneys' classifications of billable time. When a trustee's law firm is retained
as counsel to the trustee, "there is substantial temptation for the trustee to charge
administrative duties as legal services, and thereby attempt to obtain double
compensation. "50

The temptation to describe charges as legal rather than
managerial is too tempting, especially when "legal" time can be
compensated on an hourly basis and "managerial" time cannot.
. . [and] it would be naYve to hold that on marginal matters, the
trustee would not tend to classify the services as legal rather than
as managerial.I
If the fee application of the trustee's law firm does not carefully and accurately
segregate between services rendered by the trustee and the services rendered by
the law firm, which is more likely than not to happen, the trustee will improperly
benefit from non-legal services billed as legal services, which is a clear violation
of his fiduciary duties.1 52
The following recent cases are instructive and provide clear examples of
this widespread problem.

148
149
15o
151
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In re Peterson, 566 B.R. 179, 191 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2017).
In re King, 88 B.R. 768, 770 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
In re Butler Indus., 101 B.R. 194, 197 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
In re Mich. Interstate Ry. Co., 32 B.R. 325, 326 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

108

[Vol. 121

1. In re McCollom (2016)
The first sentence of this opinion begins with the following: "A disturbing
trend has developed among Chapter 7 panel trustees . , . to disregard the
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules as they administer their assigned
cases."153 In McCollom, the following exchange took place:
Court:
Lindstrom:

Court:

Lindstrom:

Can you tell me why are you conferring with
the [realtor] regarding the sale of property?
If my memory serves me correctly, I believe I
was telling her that the order had been signed
by the Court.
Is that not something that Mr. Tow in his
capacity as Trustee shouldn't be doing as
opposed to you?.. .Are you rendering a legal
service to the estate by calling the [realtor] and
giving the [realtor] this information?
.

.

. I believe that I-I'm not rendering a legal

opinion. I want to make sure I heard you
correctly. I'm not giving a legal opinion.' 54
Among many other infractions, the court found that "the [t]rustee, not
[his lawyer], should be conferring with his realtor to inform her that court
approval has been given for the sale of property that the realtor has been
marketing.""' "The Trustee's attorney in this case should not be billing the estate
for services that the Trustee himself should be rendering under his statutory
duties. And, the Trustee should not be allowing the Firm's attorneys to charge
the estate for services that he himself should be performing."
The court found another timekeeping breach: "Confer and correspond
with buyer's agent for easement property.""' "Once again ... communications
with prospective purchasers for sales of estate property fall within the Trustee's
statutory duties." The trustee's lawyer "should not be billing the estate for
communicating with a prospective purchaser's agent. That is the Trustee's duty,
and that is why the Trustee receives a fee under § 326(a) of the Code.""

15

In re McCollom Interests, LLC, 551 B.R. 292, 294-95 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).

156

Id. at 303.
Id
Id.

'15'

Id.

'
'55

ZMLKING THE ESTATE

2018]
2.

109

In re King (2016)

The King case involves a final fee application of a law firm representing
a trustee who is also a named partner of the firm.'"' It begins as follows:
In assessing this application, it is painfully apparent that this
trustee . . . has failed to abide by the strict rules and norms of the
bankruptcy system regarding what can be billed to the estate.
Stated differently, he has violated his fiduciary duty to the
creditors in this case by allowing his firm to seek illegitimate
fees from the estate. In complying with its duty to be a 'keeper
of the temple of justice,' this Court will now take steps to
minimize the chances of future violations.15 9
A very important aspect of the King case-like several other Chapter 7 casesis the economics involved with the fee application and the impact on the estate.
In King, the trustee had approximately $191,000 to distribute to holders of
allowed claims. 160 If the court were to approve the fee applications, the trustee's
law firm would receive approximately 67% of the proceeds; the trustee would
receive approximately 16% of the proceeds; and the unsecured creditors would
receive approximately 10% of the proceeds-i.e., $19,000.16 Due to the size of
the largest unsecured claim, $18,855.60 would go to this large unsecured claim,
with the remaining $144.40 (i.e., 0.76%) to be paid to the other five unsecured
creditors. 162
One of the frustrating aspects in the King case was the fact that a
substantial amount of the firm's fees were for services rendered that were nonlegal in nature-i.e., fees for which the estate should not have to bear. Indeed,
the court found that the trustee had "exhibited woeful control and fee monitoring
of his firm, and his willingness to let his firm seek fees from the estate in the
amount of $123,282.25 [was] assuredly not in the best interest of creditors and
the estate."l 63 In fact, the court found that the trustee's firm was "seeking
compensation for many services that have nothing to do with the practice of law
and have everything to do with the ordinary duties that any trustee can fulfill
without having to receive legal advice."'" The following is a small example of
some of the law firm's time entries that the King court properly disallowed as
having nothing to do with the practice of law and being non-legal in nature:

1

In re King, 546 B.R. 682, 685 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).
Id. (emphasis added).
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Id. at 689.
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Id.
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Id. at 736.
Id. at 736-37.
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Organizationof client's life insurance accounts.
Review of documents provided by debtor.
Review of information on personalproperty appraisal.
Review of documents regardingvaluation of development.
Meeting with debtor's ex-husband.
Telephone conference regardingstatus of bankruptcy.
Telephone conference with real estate broker regarding listing
issues.
Telephone conference with real estate broker regarding terms of
sale.
Review of documentsfor closing.
Review of title report.165

Based on these time entries, and other duplicate, excessive, and
unnecessary work, the King court entered a rather bold and unconventional order:
it disapproved fees in the amount of $81,141.50 and expenses in the amount of
$847.77 and, accordingly, changed the unsecured creditor distribution from
$19,000 to $100,989.27.'66 In concluding its order, the King court made a strong
admonition and set a remarkable precedence in the underlying bankruptcy
district:
[T]his Court will now impose procedures to ensure, as much as
possible, that whenever a Chapter 7 trustee retains his own law
firm to represent him, the firm does not receive fees for services
that the trustee should provide in his capacity as trustee.
Specifically, in the future, for every fee application that a
trustee's own law firm files, this Court will hold a hearingeven if no objections are lodged-and, at a minimum, require
the trustee himself to give testimony explaining how the services
rendered by the firm involve 'unique difficulties' beyond the
trustee's own ability to resolve. 167
[TJhe Court wants to emphasize to all Chapter 7 trustees in this
district, and all the trustee-affiliated law firms who represent
them, that they need to pay heed to § 328(b) so that they are not
billing the estate for providing non-legal services or legal
services that do not involve 'unique difficulties' beyond the
trustees' ability to handle. To the extent that the trustees and
their law firms contend that they have always billed for such
services-and that therefore they have been abiding by the
165

'
167

Id. at 701-08.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
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norms of the system-this Opinion is intended to disabuse them
of believing that they can do so in the future-at least in cases
pending before the undersigned judge. Henceforth, this Court
will be closely reviewing every entry of their timesheets to
ensure that they are not improperly billing the estate.168
3.

In re Peterson (2017)

Finally, in April 2017, another trustee and her law firm were heavily
reproved.1 69 And again, the economics were exceptionally off-putting. The
trustee's firm's fee application sought compensation in the total amount of
$84,794.20. ' Approval of that application, coupled with previously awarded
administrative fees of $51,161.86, plus the anticipated trustee compensation
under § 326, "would result in a dividend to creditors of 2.82%."17' This fee
application was the first and only application filed with the court and it was filed
four years after the entry of an order employing the trustee's law firm to represent
her.172
The trustee, who also testified as the attorney in the fee application
hearing, provided some disturbing testimony. When asked to explain how certain
services were not trustee services being billed as attorney services, for example,
she answered "Well, if it is in that fee application, then it is for attorney work.""'
And "an attorney talking to an attorney equals attorney time."' 74 At several times
during the hearing when asked about her fees, services, and actions in the
bankruptcy case, her common response was "I don't know," "I don't remember,"
and, the most alarming, "because that's the way we've always done it in this
district."'
The trustee services for which her firm sought compensation were as
follows:
-

Phone calls to counselfor lienholders.
Employment ofprofessionals.
Correspondenceregardingcommissions as assets of the estate.
Attending a hearing in third-party bankruptcy on behalf of the
estate.

168

Id. at 738.

169

In re Peterson, 566 B.R. 179 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2017).
Id at 185.

70
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Id at 185-86.
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Id. at 187.
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Review of mail and documentsfrom financial institutions.
Motion to extend dischargeobjection deadline.
Administrative objection to closure of case.
Agreement regardingstay reliefof lienholder.
Initial review of bank statements.
Initial meetings/conferences regardingpossible Ponzi scheme.
Communications and objection to applicationfor administrative
expenses.
Preparation of fee application for special counsel and
accountant.'7 6

This list represents a clear breach of the trustee's fiduciary duties. These
services were delegated to the trustee's firm, even though these are services
expressly identified in § 704 as trustee services. "The appropriate exercise of
billing judgment necessarily includes the proper delegation of tasks so as to avoid
charging the estate an inflated rate for a task that could and should be performed
by a less costly employee."' 77 But herein lies the problem: this misappropriation
of duties does not even become apparent for the court until compensation is
actually sought. If no one objects to the fee application, and if the court fails to
conduct its own thorough and independent review, creditors may be left with a
de minimis distribution. In point, if the bankruptcy court took the conventional
rubber-stamping approach and approved the fee application, distribution to
creditors in the Peterson case would amount to a paltry 2.82%. "8 Fortunately,
that is not what the court did. Instead, like the King case, the Peterson court
delivered some strong words to trustees:
In essence, the Court is only requiring the panel trustees to do
what is common practice in the legal field: justify their fees to
their clients. Again, the trustee's duty is to the estate, and the
"clients" in this context include the general unsecured creditors,
who are then intended beneficiaries of the estate and the
principal reason the estate is being administered. Had the instant
Application been submitted to a client outside the bankruptcy
context, one can only imagine what such a client would say
about a bill encompassing four years, and the severe lack of
information and explanation regarding the contents of that bill.
This Memorandum Opinion provides clear and direct guidance
as to the expectations of the Court. Therefore, the United States

176

Id. at 194.
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is directed to distribute this Opinion to all of the

panel trustees in this district.'`
The above-cited cases demonstrate the dangers attendant to a
trustee's retention of himself to serve as his own paid employee. Because
of their close relationship, the services of the trustee and his law firm
become heavily blurred. Recent case law clearly shows that the trustee
is profiting from non-legal services to the estate in violation of his
fiduciary duties.
B. Lack of Checks and Balances
The second area of conflict that emerges when a trustee employs his own
law firm as trustee's counsel is the trustee's duty to monitor all fees in the
bankruptcy case and object to any inappropriate fees pursuant to § 704(a)(5) of
the Code."so The duality of the attorney-trustee's role as trustee and as member
of the law firm basically erases the checks and balances necessary to maximize
returns to creditors. "The checks and balances inherent in the traditional attorneyclient relationship become virtually meaningless when the client is permitted to
review and pass upon the bills he submits to himself."' ' And when the time
comes to review his firm's fees, "the trustee may find herself loathe to vigorously
scrutinize the propriety of the charges."' 82
As an example, in King, there were several instances where attorneys
were billing time for the exact same conference to one another.' 8 3 In addition to
possibly being duplicative, what is even more concerning is the fact that these
conferences were billed for different amounts of time.' 8 4 in one entry, for
example, Attorney A lists .40 hours for conference with Attorney B.' 85 On that
same day Attorney B lists .20 hours for conference with Attorney A.' 86 Which
time entry is accurate, .40 or .20? Why is the trustee not catching these errors?
The attorneys are sharing the same office space as the trustee. A simple review
of the invoices and a discussion with his counsel would easily remediate this
inconsistency. Although .20 hours is not a lot of time, the King opinion illustrates
several of these inconsistencies, which do, of course, add up and dilute the estate.

1'

Id. at 200.

Iso
11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2018); see also In re Butler Indus., 101 B.R. 194, 196 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1989) (stating that the "trustee has a statutory duty to object to any fee application where the
fees requested are not appropriate" and citing to § 704(a)(5) of the Code).
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Simply put, it seems nearly impossible for a trustee to exercise the same
manner and type of billing judgment that he would exercise for private clients.
When the trustee is sharing the same bed as his counsel, who will write off the
duplicative hours or excessive time? Who will reduce time for services not
beneficial to the estate? Probably not the trustee. He is more interested in
obtaining the largest fee recovery on behalf of his firm than he is in fulfilling his
statutory duty to object to any fees that are not appropriate. This presents an
actual conflict of interest for the trustee.
C FinancialSelf-Interest
The third area of conflict that arises when a trustee retains his own law
firm is his economic self-interest. Judge Friendly summed up these concerns
well:
The reasons are plain enough. The conduct of bankruptcy
proceedings not only should be right but must seem right. Even
when litigation is likely to be the trustee's chief responsibility,
there must always be doubt whether he can make a truly
disinterested determination that his own firm, no matter what its
overall merit, is best qualified to be his counsel in the
circumstances of the particular case.... Some creditors may
doubt, as here, whether a trustee is able to take quite the same
objective and critical attitude toward the amount and quality of
effort being put forward by his own law firm that he would
toward another. On the other hand, in contrast to the situation in
this case, there may be instances where creditors would believe
the relationship had caused a trustee to be overly litigious.
Finally, even the most experienced attorney who becomes a
trustee in a complicated bankruptcy can benefit from the advice
of an independent general counsel; we need not go so far as the
familiar adage concerning self-representation by a lawyer to say
that a second head is not without value in such matters simply
because the first is exceedingly good.'
Simply put, the "trustee has a fiduciary duty to bring in funds, not
friends."'"
In S.E.C. v. Kenneth Bove & Co.,'8 9 the court expressed the view that the
representation of the trustee by his own law firm is problematic because of the

87
188
18

In re Ira Haupt & Co., 361 F.2d 164, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1966).
In re Bechuck, 472 B.R. 371, 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012).
451 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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"commingling of interests which occurs when a trustee's lawyers also are his law
partners, and they share one another's fee." 90 The court stated that a court
should be able to rely on the trustee for assistance in assessing
the necessary expenses of administration. Yet a trustee who is
represented by his own firm disables himself from offering such
assistance with respect to the application for counsel fees. Thus,
although the trustee is not prohibited from utilizing his own
firm, to do so causes serious problems when compensation is
sought. `

Another economical conflict that emerges is the possibility of a
malpractice claim by the trustee against his own law firm and his natural
disincentive to pursue such claim. This, again, presents an actual conflict. On the
one hand, pursuing a viable malpractice action against the trustee's law firm
could result in a substantial payout to unsecured creditors. On the other hand, the
malpractice claim could have a severe financial impact on the law firm and,
consequently, the trustee, as member of the firm, including an increase in
insurance premiums which would inevitably be absorbed by the firm's partners.
Naturally, the trustee is not going to pursue this claim.
Bankruptcy practitioners have also recognized dangers attendant to a
trustee's retention of his own law firm. "A trustee who represents himself has a
built-in conflict in most cases in that his economic self-interest will tempt him to
characterize his work as legal, not managerial."1 9 2 Moreover, research shows that
in most cases where professionals are retained, the cost of administration
frequently results in a decrease in ultimate distribution to creditors.

193

94

Consider In re McLean Wine Co.1 The McLean case dealt with the
trustee's counsel seeking $113,627.06 in fees and costs for services rendered.19
In one adversary proceeding commenced by trustee's counsel, the maximum
possible recovery from the litigation, based on the actual complaint filed, was
approximately $30,000. 196 Yet, the trustee's counsel expended nearly $28,000 in
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an attempt to recoup the $30,000 for the estate, and actually ended up losing
$5,000.197

In another adversary proceeding, the complaint sought to recover alleged
fraudulent transfers and the turnover of a truck or its value.'" As set forth in the
complaint, the trustee sought recovery of cash payments of $2,055.06 or the
truck's value of $4,500.'99 Against a maximum possible recovery of only $4,500,
the trustee's counsel rendered services in excess of $3 1,000.200
From an initial cost-benefit analysis, or at some point during the
litigation process, a reasonable cost-benefit analysis "would have indicated that
fees and costs were quickly rising to a level very near the maximum possible
recovery." 20 ' Once it became reasonably obvious that the prospective costs of
commencing or continuing litigation exceeded any benefit to the estate, were the
trustee and the firm not duty-bound to abandon the claim? When a cause of action
has a known maximum recovery, does a trustee not abuse his discretion when he
(or his counsel) renders services significantly in excess of that amount? But who
wants to "call out" his own firm for excessive fees? The trustee clearly has this
independent fiduciary duty to the estate, but when his firm will inevitably fill his
own pockets, why not roll the dice and make some money?
Telling a third-party firm, with whom the trustee has no financial
interest, to abandon fruitless litigation, reduce duplicative or unnecessary fees,
and conserve assets does not seem entirely that difficult. However, making
efforts to maximize the estate by substantially reducing the fees of the firm who
pays you a salary and significant origination presents an entirely different
financial dilemma. On the one hand, the trustee is in a position to make a
significant chunk of change. On the other hand, he has the ability to conserve the
assets of the estate so that creditors receive a greater distribution. Which route
will he choose? In most cases, the trustee's economic self-interest will likely
motivate him to remain silent about the services his firm is rendering, even if
those fees are entirely out of sync with the value of the asset sought to be
recovered.
In re McCollom is another compelling case. 202 In that case, the trustee
hired a firm to represent him.2 03 The firm, however, was not independent of the
trustee. In fact, the trustee's daughter was employed as an attorney at the firm.2 04
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This critical fact was not disclosed to the court or the creditors.205 In the fee
application filed by the firm, the firm estimated that there would be no
distribution at all to the general unsecured creditors.206 One can only imagine
how creditors felt when this information eventually came to light. In addition to
the erosion of creditor confidence in the trustee, the creditors likely saw the fee
application and questioned whether the trustee even gave the application filed by
the firm any scrutiny. Indeed, if the trustee's daughter would be financially
harmed if the trustee reined in the litigation, reduced fees, or looked for more
cost-effective ways to resolve disputes, would he do it? Perhaps not. As an
example, according to the firm's invoice, one of the trustee's attorneys made two
duplicative time entries.207 If the trustee had reviewed the invoice as carefully as
he should have, given his fiduciary duty to creditors, he likely would have caught
the issue. Maybe he did catch it, but saw more of a downside to disputing the
time entry. At the very least, both the trustee's and the firm's billing business
judgment was lacking.
The bankruptcy court also saw the trustee-attorney relationship and the
fees in this case as problematic. It stated,
the failure of both the trustee and the firm to make disclosure
about [the trustee's daughter, who was employed by the firm],
and also to obtain approval for [the daughter] to render services
for the estate, reflects a glaring omission of experienced and
board-certified professionals that greatly concerns this Court.2 08
The court added:
By supporting an unjustified fee request that, if approved, would
put dollars into the pockets of the [law firm] that employs his
daughter, the Trustee is thumbing his nose at the unsecured
creditors in this case, who would receive some or all of the
dollars that the Trustee wants this Court to authorize him to
remit to the Firm.209
Lastly, in In re IFS FinancialCorp.,20 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

was presented with the following issue on appeal: whether a trustee's conduct in
attempting to bill the bankruptcy estate for a trip that he made with his wife and
children was a breach of his fiduciary duty and amounted to "cause" for removal
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as trustee.2 11 In short, Smith and his law firm were required to defend an appeal
of a judgment.2 12 Oral arguments were scheduled before the Fifth Circuit in New
Orleans. 2 13 Smith, the trustee, attended as lawyer and trustee. 214 His wife, Ms.
Smith, attended as the trustee's lawyer.2 " Their two children also attended.2 16
The estate was billed approximately $3,500 in travel expenses related to the oral
argument.2 17 These expenses were incurred over a five-day period, and included
hotel room charges of over $1,600, over $600 in food charges, $900 in airline
tickets, and $170 in taxi fares. 218
Because the bills were from Smith's own law firm, his fiduciary duty
required him to assure that the transactions with his law firm were subject to the
highest standards of fundamental fairness. 2 19 At the bankruptcy court level, the
court found that "[t]he history of th[e] case reflect[ed] Smith ha[d] consistently
acted to advance his law firm's interests to the detriment of the estate." 22 0 And
that his "prior conduct is evidence of his intent to act against his fiduciary
responsibilities." 22 1 The trustee's disturbing conduct was highlighted by the
bankruptcy court as follows:
-

-

-
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Smith sought to retain his own firm as counsel, alleging that
retention was justified, in part, because retention would
benefit his firm. He alleged that it was fair to retain his firm
in this potentially profitable case, because his firm accepted
unprofitable representation of other Estates. This reasoning
was rejected by the Court.
When Smith was subsequently authorized to retain his own
firm on a contingent fee basis, Smith attempted to shift
expenses (that were required to be borne by his firm) to the
Estate. This too was rejected.
When a creditor challenged Smith's misguided attempt to
shift expenses to the Estate, Smith (acting in his trustee
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capacity) filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the creditor. The
lawsuit was designed solely to punish the creditor for acting
against Smith's firm. Although Smith denied that the
lawsuit was retaliatory, the Court finds that his testimony
on this issue lacked credibility.
When the Court issued an expense ruling that was favorable
to the Estate, but detrimental to Smith's firm, Smith (in his
trustee capacity) sought reconsideration of the order and
eventually appealed the order. This conduct, taken in his
trustee capacity, was designed to benefit his firm and injure
the Estate.
Smith then charged the Estate for $3,486.37 in expenses to
attend oral argument in New Orleans. A substantial portion
of the charges are wholly unjustified. No reasonable person
would have authorized the Estate to reimburse Smith's firm
for the unjustified expenses.222

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that Smith's conduct
justified removal since his conduct was found to be a "violation of the trustee's
fiduciary duties, misconduct or failure to perform the trustee's duties." 22 3 The
Fifth Circuit also recognized that the best interests of the estate must be
considered, and it found that the bankruptcy court did by stating that "[lthe court,
and parties in interest, must not be called upon to examine each action taken by
a trustee . . ..

[They] should have confidence that a trustee will never

intentionally breach a fiduciary obligation." 224 In this case, he most certainly did.
In the above-cited cases, who is the beneficiary of the trustee's
misconduct? It is the trustee's law firm and, of course, the trustee. These cases
demonstrate the clearest example of self-dealing and intentional breaches of
fiduciary duties. One cannot ignore the fact that when a trustee retains his own
law firm, a built-in conflict of interest exists. Yet, the Bankruptcy Code
authorizes this arrangement if the "best-interest-of-the-estate" test is
demonstrated. Based upon just the few cases discussed herein, is this showing
even possible? When a trustee retains his firm, his firm holds an interest adverse
to the estate whenever compensation is sought. The trustee will not have "the
same objective and critical attitude toward the amount and quality of effort being
put forward by his own law firm that he would toward another."22 5 It is clear
from the cited cases that "[tjhe trustee occupies a position of divided loyalty
when she is required to zealously represent the interests of the estate while
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retaining at least some interest in seeing that her firm obtain recovery of its fees
for time and resources expended on the case."226 Consequently, "[i]t is not
unreasonable to imagine that a typical bankruptcy trustee . . might rely to a
greater or lesser extent on the resources of the trustee's firm to effectively carry
out the trustee's administrative duties."
In short, the employment of the trustee's law firm arguably creates an
impermissible conflict of interest and is never in the best interest of the estate.
How will a trustee not succumb to the various temptations to make more money
at the estate's cost? It seems nearly impossible, especially when one understands
how simple it is to disguise attorney-trustee fees and provide obscure and
ambiguous invoices. Nonetheless, the Code expressly allows this employment
arrangement. And until Congress repeals § 327(d), which it may never, creditors
are stuck with the issues and financial harm identified in this Article. Courts,
however, can take several steps to minimize the milking.
V.

MINIMIZING THE MILKING

Courts need to do more to protect the estate and creditors, and at this
moment, they are not. This Article is not identifying a minor problem occurring
in very limited situations-the problem is widespread. As one court noted,
"[d]espite having an experienced group of panel trustees, through the years, the
practice of hiring their own firms to represent estates has become a routine rather
than being an exception."2 28 In the Peterson case, for example, the trustee
testified that she has been a Chapter 7 trustee for 28 years and in that position,
for that period of time, she "handled thousands of cases in her role as Trustee
and, she stated, hundreds wherein she employed the firm to represent her as
Trustee."2 29 Surely this is not the first time the trustee in Peterson
misappropriated her fiduciary duties. This cannot be the first instance where this
trustee improperly charged fees to the estate.
The Code charges bankruptcy courts with an independent duty to review
all fee applications presented in all bankruptcy cases. 23 0 This review, of course,
is to ensure that the requested fees are reasonable, necessary, and justified and
that estates are being administered economically. One of the main resources a
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bankruptcy judge uses to assist in maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy
system is the trustee assigned to a case. After all, the trustee is on the frontlines
of the bankruptcy system. However, when the trustee has employed himself and
his law firm as attorneys for the trustee, both to be paid from the receipts of the
estate, the court stands alone in this endeavor. When this happens, the court's
oversight of the trustee and the estate becomes particularly important. Section
327(d)'s "best-interest" test and § 328's limitation on compensation of
professionals employed by the estate, is wholly insufficient to deal with the
attorney-trustee fee abuse.
Furthermore, when it comes to the trustee's own fees, rather than
encouraging bankruptcy judges to undertake an independent evaluation of the
fees being sought and whether the trustee's services were actual and necessary,
recent case law mandates an automatic maximum commission-based approach
for the Chapter 7 trustee. On January 26, 2018, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
was presented with the following issue: whether §§ 326 and 330 of the
Bankruptcy Code allow a court to reduce a trustee's commission.2 3 1 In
addressing this issue, the Fifth Circuit identified two approaches for determining
the appropriate "commission" for Chapter 7 trustees. One approach is that
"Section 326(a) is not simply a maximum but also a presumptively reasonable
fixed commission rate to be reduced only in rare instances or 'extraordinary
circumstances. "'232
The second approach declines to presume § 326(a) percentages as
reasonable because the "bankruptcy court has discretion to award reasonable
compensation only for actual and necessary services, and may award an amount
less than that requested by the trustee. "233 Under this approach, "the court can
and should consider all surrounding facts and circumstances in deciding whether
to award something less than the Section 326 commission .... "234
After discussing these approaches, the Fifth Circuit chose to adopt the
interpretation aligned with the first approach-i.e., that the percentage amounts
listed in § 326 are presumptively reasonable for Chapter 7 awards. 235 This
holding is troubling and harmful to creditors. Determining a trustee's
compensation based strictly on a percentage rather than on a factor-based
assessment of the trustee's services opens the fee-abuse door even wider than it
already is. Under this holding, trustees are under no obligation to demonstrate
that their compensation is reasonable or proportionate. They are under no
obligation to show that the work they performed was for actual and necessary
services on behalf of the estate. In fact, this holding basically means that trustees
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have an absolute right to be paid the maximum commissions allowed under §
326(a) and that bankruptcy judges must slavishly award the maximum even if
the fee is substantially disproportionate in relation to the value of the trustee's
services. Taking away the bankruptcy court's discretion when it comes to trustee
awards is simply another failure on the part of a system designed to protect
creditors and the bankruptcy estate.
The United States' trustee perpetuates this problem. Without referring to
any statute or other authority, the U.S. trustee program announced that it would
not object to maximum commissions for Chapter 7 trustees except in
"extraordinary circumstances" that it "expected to arise only in rare and unusual
circumstances." 23 6 This is merely the U.S. trustee's statement of policy issued
without rulemaking authority and, thus, lacks force of law. Yet, its
pronouncement encourages further trustee fee abuse, considering it has now been
communicated to trustees that the U.S. trustee will neither scrutinize nor review
their fee requests. Instead, the U.S. trustee will simply punt to the bankruptcy
court and creditors and allow them to sift through all of the problems inherent in
the fee applications. As one court put, "[fit is an announcement that the U.S.
trustee, except in 'extraordinary' circumstances that can be as rare as the U.S.
trustee pleases, will focus attention elsewhere and leave chapter 7 trustee
compensation to parties and the courts."237
Paradoxically, one of the U.S. trustee's fundamental principles is that "a
trustee shall not administer an estate or an asset in an estate where the proceeds
of liquidation will primarily benefit the trustee." 23 8 One is left to wonder how
that principle is not offended when the U.S. trustee-and now the Fifth Circuit
-permits the Chapter 7 trustee to appropriate the lion's share of available funds
through excessive, unreasonable, and disproportionate commissions. And,
"[w]hile the trustee .. . has a duty to monitor, comment, and object to fees, it

does not do its duty."23 9 An example of this was shown in In re Scoggins,24 0
where the bankruptcy court noted that in a two-year period, there were
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creditors, before administering a case as an asset case.
Id. (emphasis added).
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approximately 62,000 Chapter 7 cases filed in the Eastern District of California,
yet the U.S. trustee filed zero "comments" or "oppositions" to Chapter 7 trustee
fees during that period. 24 1
One may also ask: what is the harm in a disproportionate and excessive
trustee fee if nobody objects? "The harm is the loss of public confidence in the
integrity of the bankruptcy system if it comes to be regarded as managed
primarily for the benefit of those who operate it." 242 Moreover, the ease at which
trustees and their counsel can milk the estate creates discontentment and, in some
cases, apathy amongst the judiciary. Judges who once diligently and
independently scrutinized fee applications are now compelled by case law to turn
a blind eye absent "extraordinary circumstances." Presiding over a broken
system must be a cumbersome and weighty endeavor. One can imagine that a
"if-you-can't-beat-'em-join-'em" mentality is pervasive amongst the bankruptcy
judiciary.
In an ideal world, creditors and the U.S. trustee would exploit the estate
milking, but in the real world, this is not happening. The U.S. trustee is failing in
its duty to monitor and object to fees, and creditors rarely object because they
are not given transparent information from which to object. Further, even if a
creditor was given this information, the costs and fees of hiring lawyers and
objecting to fee applications would, in almost all cases, exceed the amount of the
creditor's entire claim. Fortunately, even in the absence of help from creditors
and the U.S. trustee, there are several mechanisms courts can effortlessly adopt
to protect the estate, creditors, and the sanctity of the bankruptcy process.
A.

The PreliminaryBudget andAsset-Recovery Plan

When a trustee files an application to employ a particular firm to
represent the estate, bankruptcy courts should focus on whether the proposed
professional will maximize the value for the estate. If an application lacks
sufficient information to convince the bankruptcy court that the proposed lawyer
is the best choice to represent the estate, the court has substantial discretion to
deny the application. 243 At a minimum, the application should disclose (1) the
history of success of the proposed lawyer and past representations of trustees; (2)
how often the proposed lawyer has undertaken the specific tasks assigned to them
in the underlying case; and (3) the fees charged in prior trustee representations
and the value of their services on the estate. But even after the court determines
that the attorney is qualified and is the best choice to maximize the estate, it
cannot go dormant.

241
242
243

Id.
Id.
In re Bechuck, 472 B.R. 371, 375 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012).

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

124

[Vol. 121

Courts should require the Chapter 7 trustee to file a litigation budget and
asset-recovery plan as part of the employment application or shortly after
employment has been authorized. Currently, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require that the trustee prepare or
obtain litigation budgets or litigation plans. Yet, "[tjhe most powerful tools for
managing litigation expense are the litigation plan and budget." 2 " Evaluating the
risk and likelihood of success in pursuing causes of action or other assets for the
benefit of the estate should be a crucial part of the trustee's job, which the
creditors expect the trustee to fulfill. This undertaking of providing the court and
the creditors advance direction of the steps that will be taken in the prosecution
of the matter and a reasonable prediction of what it may cost to take those steps,
even if there are some uncertainties, should not be problematic. Necessitating a
reasonable litigation plan and corresponding budget would substantially curtail
the widespread fee abuse. For example, when the trustee and his professionals
file their fee applications with their attached invoices, the court and creditors can,
among other things, match the time entries against the previously filed budget
and plan.
Not surprisingly, "[v]irtually every company employing lawyers today
has written guidelines, whether internal or published to outside counsel, which
purport to support the goal of reducing legal spending. More often than not, the
guidelines require that counsel prepare and submit a budget for any significant
legal matter."24 5 If this is such common practice in the legal world, why are
courts not requiring it from the trustee and his counsel? Guidelines and budgets
comport with the basic premise that "one of the obvious steps required to reduce
legal costs are trying to determine what they are, what they will be in the future,
where they go and the extent to which they are necessary. A budget can help a
client [and creditors] with these determinations."2 46
Another purpose of the budget and plan beyond simply managing costs
is it facilitates advance consideration and discussion about the assets the trustee
is considering chasing and whether any value truly exists in those assets. Among
other things, a budget and plan would force the trustee and his lawyers to (1)
evaluate the merits of all potential claims; (2) analyze the solvency of the
potential defendants and the collectability of a judgment; (3) consider the
likelihood of settlement; and (4) map out a strategy that would provide an actual
positive return to the estate.
Furthermore, the budget and plan are not solely for benefit of the court
and creditors. Indeed, these tools would help the trustee and his counsel
immensely. In addition to functioning as a valuable blueprint for the particular
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bankruptcy case, an early budget prepared by the trustee and his lawyers could
mitigate cost concerns when fee applications are filed. For example, creditors
would be hard pressed to challenge fees which were expressly and transparently
predicted in the budget and plan. Questioning the trustee's decision and
discretion to pursue a particular cause of action would be frivolous, at best, if
that action was identified in the litigation plan and the creditor made no such
challenge at that time. While the creditor's inaction to the initial litigation plan
would likely not operate as a complete waiver, a fairly strong estoppel argument
could be made by the trustee and his counsel. This, alone, confers a benefit on
the trustee.
Obviously, one important issue is how the trustee and his counsel create
the budget and litigation plan. The purpose of this Article is not to generate a
sample budget or litigation plan, as this author does not believe any one type of
approach is best. In addition, all claims and causes of action possess a fair amount
of idiosyncrasies, so coming up with a model plan or a one-size-fits-all approach
is a wasteful endeavor. Instead, this Article offers a few simple suggestions for
courts to consider. In any adversary proceeding, there are five basic cost points:
pleadings, discovery, motion practice, hearings/trial, and appeals. The litigation
plan and budget should reduce to writing how these cost points will be managed
in each adversary proceeding commenced by the trustee. A well-designed
litigation plan and budget should include the projected cost of the adversary
proceeding as well as the projected costs of the basic cost points. This
undertaking can be accomplished without forcing the trustee to furnish any
privileged information or litigation strategy. Indeed, the trustee and his counsel
are doing nothing more than identifying causes of action and projecting the
reasonable costs.
For the most part, neither the trustee nor his counsel should have
problems preparing a realistic legal fee budget. The majority of adversary
proceedings filed by the trustee involve avoidance claims under the Bankruptcy
Code. And the majority of contested matters brought by the trustee generally
involves asset sales, turnover motions, or other similar asset-recovery claims.
The trustee and his counsel can use experience and historical data from other
similar cases and matters to establish price tags for each step of the plan. While
the trustee and his counsel may balk at this endeavor, preparing a budget and
plan is arguably part of fulfilling their fiduciary duties. Courts have recognized
that counsel for the trustee has a fiduciary duty to "realistically weigh the
maximum possible success of any litigation against the costs to be incurred
pursuing the litigation."24 7 "A lawyer hired by a trustee in bankruptcy to do legal
work for the estate, like the trustee himself, is a fiduciary of the estate."248 In
order to weigh the success of the litigation against the costs, and maximize the
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value of the estate, a litigation budget and plan are necessary. "The attorney in
his or her fiduciary capacity, bears not only a duty to conserve the estate's net
assets, but to maximize the value of the estate." 24 9 "A trustee and his attorney
must undertake the same analysis that attorneys make in all types of cases to
determine whether the potential costs and risks of litigation are justified."2"o And
this "analysis, balancing costs versus benefits, must be taken at the time services
are rendered."

251

A lawyer must consider the amount in dispute and discount that
by the likelihood of success in order to properly evaluate the
worth of litigation, and then owes a professional duty to the
client to recommend that no action be commenced if the cost of
the battle exceeds the value of the litigation.252
Without a transparent plan and budget, it is more likely than not that the
trustee's counsel will not undertake this evaluation, especially if there are already
substantial funds in the estate to pay the legal fees. Instead, they might just start
milking the estate.
Interestingly, in several Chapter 11 cases, the United States Trustee
ordinarily will seek the use of fee and expense budgets and staffing plans, either
with the consent of the parties or by court order as soon as feasible after the
commencement of the bankruptcy case. 5 In fact, the use of budgets in Chapter
11 is so important that the United States Trustee considers fee applications in the
context of budgets used in the case and counsel is urged to consult with the
United States Trustee whether they anticipate delays in formulating a budget.254
As part of this budget, counsel is suggested to disclose the number of lawyers
expected to work on the matter during the budget period, including years of
experience. 255 Further, budgets can and should be amended as necessary to
reflect changed circumstances or unanticipated events.
As part of this process, the United States Trustee may also seek a court
order expressly authorizing the exchange of budgets by counsel for the debtorin-possession and the officer committees once they are approved by their
respective clients or whenever amended. And these budgets may be provided
subject to an appropriate confidentiality agreement and redacted to protect all
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privileged or confidential information. "The confidential and prospective
exchange of budgets between thesefiduciariesconcerns the administration of the
case and potentially avoids duplication."2 56
If this budgetary practice in Chapter 11 cases is so customary and
routine, Chapter 7 trustees and their counsel should have no problem following
similar guidelines and mandates.
B. Interim Reports, Applications, and the Duty to Abandon
As some of the cases discussed throughout this Article demonstrate,
without a clear roadmap for the litigation matter, trustee's counsel may spare no
expense in an effort to prevail. A litigation plan and budget, however, filed with
the court, would help avoid the Pyrrhic victory that some trustees are known for
obtaining. But courts should not stop there. The trustee and his counsel should
also be required to file interim reports and fee applications with the bankruptcy
court providing updates of the various proceedings commenced by the trustee,
the fees and costs incurred and requested thus far, the likelihood of settlement or
obtaining judgment, and the likelihood of collecting.
Courts routinely find that the fiduciary duties discussed in this Article
also require counsel for the trustee to discontinue litigation when it becomes
apparent that the fees charged will outpace the maximum possible recovery.
"This duty obligates the lawyer for the estate to abandon litigation once it
becomes reasonably obvious that the cost of pursuing litigation over a particular
matter is out of sync with the value of the asset sought to be recovered."25 7 "Once
it becomes reasonably obvious that the prospective costs of commencing or
continuing litigation will exceed any benefit to the estate, the attorney is duty
bound to abandon the claim."25 8 The "reasonably obvious" standard is objective
and asks, "did a time come when a reasonable lawyer in [the counsel's] position
would have abandoned the suit?"25 9 Thus, it is abundantly clear that counsel for
the trustee is only justified in pursuing litigation "only until it [becomes]
reasonably obvious that further litigation would cost more than it was likely to
bring into the estate." 2 60
But who will suggest that the trustee and his counsel dump fruitless
claims and save the estate money if the creditors and the court are not receiving
interim updates regarding the status of the litigation as well as periodic or
quarterly fee requests? This exact scenario occurred in In re McLean Wine Co.,261
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discussed previously, where the trustee's counsel sought $113,627.06 in fees and
costs for services rendered as counsel for the trustee.262 In one adversary
proceeding, the maximum possible recovery from the litigation, based on the
actual complaint filed, was approximately $30,000.263 Yet, the trustee's counsel
expended nearly $28,000 in an attempt to recoup the $30,000 for the estate, and
actually ended up losing $5,000.26 In another adversary proceeding, the
complainant sought to recover alleged fraudulent transfers and the turnover of a
truck or its value. 265 As set forth in the complaint, the trustee sought recovery of
cash payments of $2,055.06 or the truck's value of $4,500.266 Against a
maximum possible recovery of only $4,500, the trustee's counsel rendered
services in excess of $31,000.267

Had the bankruptcy court mandated detailed interim reports regarding
all outstanding litigation in the McLean case, as well as quarterly fee
applications, both the court and creditors could have forced the trustee and his
counsel to abandon these actions that were clearly not yielding a benefit to the
estate. Case law demonstrates that neither the trustee nor his counsel are
exercising this critical, independent professional judgment to discontinue
litigation where costs of continuing litigation will exceed any benefit to the
estate. As such, courts should mandate interim litigation and cost reports from
the trustee and his counsel. These updates are an excellent way of keeping the
trustee, the court, and the creditors updated. Additionally, courts must mandate
that the trustee and his counsel file periodic fee applications on a quarterly basis,
at a minimum. If these additional suggestions are adopted, trust in the system
would be strengthened and the trustee's counsel would be forced to become more
sensitive to the costs involved. These minimal requirements will pay
extraordinary dividends to the bankruptcy estate.
C A Callfor Repeal of§ 327(d)
A bankruptcy judge made a recent invitation to Congress that merits
consideration:
Whenever Congress next considers amending the Code, it might
want to change the existing provision allowing trustees to retain
firms with which they are affiliated. IFS Financial
Corp., King, and the case at bar-which involve three different
Chapter 7 trustees in this District-suggest that trustees, instead
262
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of looking out for the interests of unsecured creditors to whom
they owe a fiduciary duty, are looking out more for the interests
of their affiliated law firms and themselves to the detriment of
unsecured creditors. Indeed, these cases reveal an unsavory side
of the bankruptcy practice that harkens back to an era when
bankruptcy was considered by many to be a corrupt practice of
the law.268
When code provisions conflict and cannot be harmonized, or when they
are failing in their purpose, a repeal or amendment may be appropriate. Section
327(d) conflicts with § 327(a). When the trustee hires himself as his own
attorney, there is an inherent conflict of interest and real potential for abuse.
Section 327(a) provides that a trustee may employ attorneys "that do not hold or
represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested
persons. " 26 9As one court observed: "The Code states that the attorney must be
both disinterested and not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate. §
327(a) is [a] qualification section, and as such, failure to meet either element
mandates disqualification." 2 70 Thus, to be qualified under § 327(a), attorneys
must meet two requirements: (1) they must not hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate; and (2) they must be disinterested persons within the
meaning of the Code. 27 1 "Together, the statutory requirements of
disinterestedness and no interest adverse to the estate 'serve the important policy
of ensuring that all professionals appointed pursuant to § 327(a) tender undivided
loyalty and provide untainted
advice and assistance in furtherance of their
2 72
fiduciary responsibilities."'
To "hold an adverse interest to the estate" means "(1) to possess or assert
any economic interest that would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy estate
or that would create either an actual or potential dispute in which the estate is a
rival claimant; or (2) to possess a predisposition under circumstances that render
such a bias against the estate." 2 73 A "disinterested person" is defined in § 101(14)
as, among other things, a person that "does not have an interest materially
adverse to the interest of the estate." 274 One bankruptcy court stated:
Bankruptcy Code 101(13)[(14)(C)] was adopted from
Bankruptcy Rule 10-202(c)(2)(D). "It appears broad enough to
include anyone who in the slightest degree might have some
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interest or relationship that would color the independent and
impartial attitude required by the Code." 2 Collier on
Bankruptcy Para. 327.03[fj, p. 327-16 (15th Ed.1981). The
purpose of the rule is to prevent a conflict without regard to the
person's integrity. Conflicting loyalties may arise even from
remote or indirect associations. 2 Collier P. 327.03[f]. The goal
should be not to prevent actual evil in this particular case, but
the tendency to evil in all cases.275
Despite the requirements found in § 327(a)-being disinterested and not
holding an interest adverse to the estate-and "even in the face of legitimate
conflict of interest concerns regarding delegation of work between the trustee
and the trustee-as-attorney," 276 Congress somehow approved § 327(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which expressly allows a trustee to retain his own law firm to
represent him in his capacity as a trustee.277 That section requires nothing more
than a showing that such employment be in the "best interests of the estate." 278
This term, as discussed previously, is not defined by the Code and courts have
been unable to formulate a precise meaning or test. Because of this ambiguity
and uncertainty, it is appropriate to examine § 327(d)'s legislative history. The
legislative history for the "best interests" test pre-dates the current Code section.
In adopting the 1978 Code, however, legislative history emphasized the need for
reform
to eliminate the abuses and detrimental practices that had been
found to prevail [under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898]. Among
such practices was the cronyism of the "bankruptcy ring" and
attorney control of bankruptcy cases. In fact, the House Report
noted that "[i]n practice . .. [t]he bankruptcy system operates

more for the benefit of attorneys than for the benefit of the
creditors."2 79
In short, "[a]ll of § 327 is aimed at eliminating any appearance of impropriety in
the trustee's selection of professionals." 280
Along these lines, the legislative history of § 328(b) indicates that the
purpose of permitting the trustee (and his firm) to serve as his own counsel is to
reduce costs. The House Report further states that the purpose "is not included
to provide the trustee with a bonus by permitting him to receive two fees for the
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same services . . . . Thus, this subsection requires the court to differentiate

between the trustee's services as trustee, and his services as trustee's counsel,
and to fix compensation accordingly." 281
The proper question, therefore, is whether § 327(d)-permitting inhouse employment-conflicts with § 327(a)-prohibiting employment of
interested persons or those that hold an interest adverse to the estate. This author
contends it does. And case law demonstrates that these two sections are at odds.
If § 327(a) is aimed at eliminating any appearance of impropriety in the trustee's
selection of counsel, including the requirement that counsel must be both
disinterested and not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, how is §
327(d)'s authorization of in-house employment to be read when juxtaposed with
the significant amount of case law showing such a widespread abuse? Section
327(a) is clear that divided loyalties are a concern, yet divided loyalties are
inherently endorsed by § 327(d). Indeed, how can the trustee make a truly
disinterested and objective decision when both he and his firm stand to gain
financially by milking the estate?
Cronyism is at its optimum when the trustee hires his own firm. In
addition to eroding creditor confidence, the estate actually suffers. When large
fee applications are filed by the trustee's firm, will the trustee really give these
applications the same scrutiny he would give to those of an outside firm? The
cases discussed thus far prove that trustees are refusing to rein in the lawyers of
their firm who appear to be more interested in being overly litigious than
maximizing the return to creditors. Another obvious concern is that the trustee
might receive less candid and independent advice from inside counsel.28 2 Indeed,
"[w]ill a partner or associate in the trustee's own firm be comfortable questioning
the trustee's strategies and assessments? On the other hand, will the trustee feel
free to question his firm's advice?" 283 The answer is likely, "no." One of the
trustee's duties is to monitor all legal fees in the bankruptcy case, including those
of the trustee's legal counsel. In fact, the trustee has a statutory duty to object to
any fee application where the fees requested are not appropriate.2 84 Yet, when
the trustee's own law firm is appointed as his counsel, he is clearly interested in
obtaining the largest fee recovery on behalf of his firm. This, alone, presents an
actual conflict of interest for the trustee.
Furthermore, § 327(d), standing alone, is problematic. It states that the
trustee may act as his own lawyer if such employment is in the estate's "best
interest."285 Quite possibly, appointment of a trustee's own law firm as counsel
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is never in the estate's best interest and rarely serves to "reduce costs," as
discussed in the House Report associated with § 327(d). Instead, the employment
arrangement represents a chance for misuse of estate assets, especially because
legal fees are paid by the bankruptcy estate. This, of course, causes an associated
reduction in creditor distributions. This is particularly troublesome when the
legal fees have been shown to not adequately increase the value of the bankruptcy
estate. Moreover, the line between a trustee duty and a legitimate legal expense
is particularly blurry when in-house employment and case law has shown time
and again that the trustee is "double dipping" by billing certain tasks as an
"attorney" when he should be performing the same task as one of the
administrative functions of his job as a trustee. As one court stated, "[w]here the
trustee or the trustee's law firm is appointed as the trustee's own attorney, there
is a substantial temptation for the trustee to charge administrative duties as legal
services, and thereby to attempt to obtain double compensation." 2 86
Consequently, "[o]n marginal matters, at least, the trustee would tend to classify
the services as legal rather than managerial." 2 87
In short, eliminating § 327(d) would (1) ensure that the requirements of
§ 327(a) are adequately satisfied when the trustee seeks to employ counsel and
(2) curtail the widespread fee abuse and the appearance of impropriety. If the
trustee employs outside counsel, he is more likely to monitor legal fees in the
bankruptcy case. He is more likely to object to fees that are not appropriate. He
is more likely interested in maximizing the value of the estate, rather than
obtaining excessive and large fee recoveries on behalf of his law firm. Moreover,
outside counsel is much less likely to undertake administrative duties for a trustee
and shoulder the risk of disallowance of its fees for these services. In other words,
eliminating § 327(d) eradicates the conflict of interest that is inherently present
in in-house employment arrangements.
This author recognizes that amendments to the Bankruptcy Code may
not be in the near future. Consequently, bankruptcy courts should consider
whether it is appropriate to adopt a policy in their jurisdiction of not allowing a
trustee to employ himself and his firm as attorney for the estate since it may never
be in the estate's best interest because of the inherent impropriety in such an
arrangement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The problems identified herein are significant. While a trustee should
have some latitude in selecting legal counsel, when it comes to in-house
employment, more parameters and safeguards-other than the vague "best
interest" standard-are required to protect the estate from abuse. The duality of
the attorney-trustee's role as trustee and as member of the law firm basically
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erases the checks and balances necessary to maximize returns to creditors and
completely erodes creditor confidence.
For trustees who wish to employ themselves and their firms as counsel,
courts should require the trustee to produce a preliminary budget and assetrecovery plan at the inception of employment or as a condition to employment.
At a minimum, this rather simple undertaking will allow the bankruptcy court
and creditors to fully understand why legal counsel has been employed and then
assess the worth of litigation. At the same time, a budget and asset-recovery plan
will force the trustee and his counsel to realistically weigh the maximum possible
success of any litigation against the costs to be incurred pursuing the litigation.
Another safety device courts should adopt is a requirement that the
trustee and his counsel file interim-reports and periodic detailed fee applications
supported by time records and narrative statements of service. With these
periodic reports and applications, the trustee and his counsel will be forced to
discontinue litigation when it becomes apparent that the fees charged will
outpace the maximum possible recovery. And if they fail to abandon such
fruitless litigation, their fees should not be recoverable.
Lastly, Congress should consider eliminating § 327(d) because of the
conflict it creates with § 327(a). And courts, at the very least, should consider
disallowing this employment arrangement altogether.
[P]rofessionals engaged in the conduct of a bankruptcy case
should be free of the slightest personal interest which might be
reflected in their decisions concerning matters of the debtor's
estate or which might impair the high degree of impartiality and
detached judgment expected of them during the course of
administration. 28 8
"The conduct of bankruptcy proceedings not only should be right but
seem right.""' When a trustee-who clearly holds a fiduciary obligation to the
debtor's estate and its creditors-hires himself and his firm to represent the
estate, he places himself in a position which gives the appearance of impropriety
and creates a conflict of interest. Indeed, equitable principles require that a
fiduciary only serve one master. 290 This in-house employment arrangement
inherently compromises the trustee's primary duty to maximize the value of the
bankruptcy estate. By retaining their own law firms to represent them, and then
requesting illegitimate legal fees to be paid by the estate, trustees are in clear
breach of their fiduciary duties to creditors. This conduct should not be tolerated
by courts or acceptable to creditors of the bankruptcy estate.
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As such, courts (and Congress) should foreclose this behavior by
establishing and implementing the safeguards discussed herein, including
outright denial of in-house employment requests. If this problem is overlooked
or minimalized, trustees and their law firms will continue to view the bankruptcy
estate as a cash cow and will milk it (and bilk it) for all its worth.

